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1 
A More Regular Process for Irregular Rendition 
A. John Radsan∗
He is a foot soldier in a clash between radical Islam and the 
United States that exploded on September 11, 2001.1  With respect 
and admiration, his followers call him Abu Omar.2  He is an Islamic 
cleric from Egypt who was granted political asylum in Italy in 1997.3  
There, in a Milan mosque for all to see and hear, he exhorted radi-
cals to wage an outward jihad against the infidels.4
Governmental authorities in Europe and America are at a loss 
about what to do with people like Abu Omar—whether to treat him 
as a law enforcement problem, a military problem, an intelligence 
problem, or as no problem at all.  Regardless of the kind of problem 
Abu Omar represents, the Italian security services and the intelli-
gence services from allied countries had, at a minimum, taken notice 
of him.  Some intelligence services even suspected Abu Omar of be-
ing a European affiliate for Ansar al-Islam, a terrorist group that has 
conducted anti-Western operations in Iraq.5
On February 17, 2003, some people took matters into their own 
hands.6  Without notice to Abu Omar and without a judicial or ad-
 
 ∗ Associate Professor, William Mitchell College of Law (john.rad-
san@wmitchell.edu).  Professor Radsan served as both a federal prosecutor and as 
assistant general counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency before he joined the le-
gal academy.  He thanks Robert Chesney, Robert Delahunty, and Doug Heidenreich 
for comments on the draft and Erin Sindberg Porter and Brian Pousson for their re-
search assistance.  Although the CIA reviewed a prior draft to make sure it did not 
contain classified information, the CIA certainly did not encourage Professor Radsan 
to publish something on irregular rendition. 
 1 See Craig Whitlock, Europeans Investigate CIA Role in Abductions; Suspects Possibly 
Taken to Nations That Torture, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2005, at A1. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Terror Watch: More Questions on Missing Imam; 
If the CIA did Abduct Abu Omar in Italy, the Timing Suggests His Rendition was Connected to 
the Upcoming War in Iraq. NEWSWEEK, June 29, 2005, 1, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
8409341/site/newsweek/. 
 6 See Whitlock, supra note 1. 
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ministrative hearing, these people snatched him from the streets of 
Milan, dumped him into a van, and whisked him on a private plane 
back to his native Egypt for less-than-friendly discussions.7  Although 
some observers alleged that the dark hand of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (“the CIA”) was behind Abu Omar’s “snatch,”8 those allega-
tions are unproven.  Whether Italian authorities participated in or 
were aware of Abu Omar’s abduction and the extent of American in-
volvement still remain a mystery.9  One Italian prosecutor, however, 
was unimpeded by the mysterious circumstances of Abu Omar’s ab-
duction.  Armed with some evidence of American involvement, this 
prosecutor issued over twenty arrest warrants against United States 
operatives for taking Abu Omar outside of Italy.10  After that, the 
prosecutor charged Italian intelligence officials for complicity in the 
abduction.11   
Inevitably, the Italian prosecutor’s search for the truth will be 
thwarted because it is unlikely that Americans indicted in the case will 
ever face charges in Italy.  The United States will not voluntarily sur-
render its officials through extradition, and it is unlikely that Italian 
authorities will transfer them through irregular means.  Apparently, 
an abduction is acceptable for a radical cleric, but not for American 
officials. 
The abduction of foreign nationals in foreign nations by United 
States agents is not something new.  Such abductions occurred before 
September 11.12  But before September 11, the purpose of a snatch 
was most often to bring an accused back to the United States for 
prosecution—not to transport him or her to another nation for inter-
rogation without charges.13  Before September 11, the suspect even-
 
 7 Id. 
 8 Stephen Grey & Don Van Natta, 13 With the C.I.A. Sought by Italy in a Kidnap-
ping, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2005, at A1. 
 9 See Dana Priest, Italy Knew About Plan to Grab Suspect; CIA Officials Cite Briefing in 
2003, WASH. POST, June 30, 2005, at A1; Craig Whitlock, Italy Denies Complicity in Al-
leged CIA Action, WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, at A14. 
 10 See Italy Seeks Arrests in Kidnapping Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A5. 
 11 Stephen Grey & Elisabetta Povoledo, Italy Arrests 2 in Kidnapping of Imam in ’03, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A1. 
 12 For example, in 1987, Lebanese terrorist suspect Fawaz Younis was rendered 
into U.S. custody after being lured onto a private yacht where F.B.I. agents captured 
him as the vessel entered international waters.  See Elaine Sciolino, Friend Led Terror 
Suspect to F.B.I., Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1987, at 3. 
 13 For instance, plans to snatch Osama Bin Laden in Sudan in 1996 were not car-
ried out because there was no criminal indictment against him. See THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST 
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 110 n.7 (2004).  A notable snatch was the case of 
Mir Amal Kasi.  After he was snatched in Afghanistan, he was rendered back to the 
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tually appeared in a public courtroom to face criminal charges.  Since 
then, snatches have changed and increased in frequency.14  Now, the 
purpose to a snatch is most often to gather intelligence by taking the 
suspect to a secret location.15
For the interrogation of terrorism suspects, secret locations out-
side the United States have several advantages for American authori-
ties.  First, other terrorists are less able to liberate their captured col-
leagues from secret locations than from known sites on the current 
battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Second, the locations may have 
more available interrogators who speak the suspect’s native language.  
Third, the locations may be more convenient, in terms of restaurants 
and hotels, for the interrogation teams.  Finally, according to the 
surprisingly candid statements of one CIA official, officials in other 
countries might use interrogation techniques that the United States 
does not, may not, and should not use.16
The number of snatches (or “renditions”) is much smaller than 
the number of enemy prisoners of war (“POWs”) Americans have 
taken in conventional wars.17  This is not to say, however, that the 
United States to face murder charges in Virginia for killing two CIA employees as 
they were about to drive into headquarters in Langley, Virginia.  See The Threat to the 
United States Posed by Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Justice, and 
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Louis J. 
Freeh, Dir. of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1999_hr/990204-freehct2.htm.  Kasi was convicted 
in 1997 and executed for his crime in November 2002.  Arnaud de Borchgrave, Paki-
stan: In flagrante delicto, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at A21. 
 14 Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary Ren-
dition” Program, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106–07. 
 15 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13. 
 16 See Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1. 
 17 A senior intelligence official said there had been fewer than 100 detainees in 
the CIA program since its inception shortly after the September 11 attacks.  Sheryl 
Gay Stolberg, Threats and Responses: The Overview; The President Moves 14 Held in Secret 
to Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at A1. During World War II the United 
States accepted hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war from the British.  John 
Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1219–20 (2004) (citing 
GEORGE G. LEWIS & JOHN MEWHA, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET NO. 20-213: HISTORY 
OF PRISONER OF WAR UTILIZATION BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY 1776–1945 83 (1955)).  
In August of 1942, the United States accepted 150,000 prisoners of war from the Brit-
ish and in November of that year accepted another 25,000.  Id.  During World War II, 
700,000 prisoners of war were transferred by the United States to the control of other 
countries, such as France, Belgium, and Luxembourg.  Id. at 1218.  See also Arnold P. 
Kramer, German Prisoners of War (2001), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/ 
handbook/online/articles/GG/qug1.html (at the end of World War II there were 
425,000 enemy prisoners in 511 main and branch camps throughout the United 
States); John Ray Skates, MISS. HISTORICAL SOC’Y, German Prisoners of War in Missis-
sippi, 1943–1946 (2004), http://mshistory.k12.ms.us/features/feature20/ 
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number of renditions is insignificant.  Rather, this is to say that rendi-
tion is something different from traditional warfare.  For instance, 
unlike prisoners of war who are monitored by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and other organizations,18 terrorism sus-
pects who have been rendered remain in the shadows—outside tradi-
tional legal process.  In effect, rendition is the hidden domain of in-
telligence services, not the open realm of courts, prosecutors, and 
defense lawyers. 
Although rendition is designed to stay out of the news, the pesky 
media have reported that the United States has rendered over 100 
people by irregular means to such places as Syria, Afghanistan, and 
Egypt since September 11.19  Through persistence, the media have 
pried loose some details on rendition.  Those details invite an analysis 
of the legality of irregular rendition under American law. 
germanprisonersofwar.html (in July, 1943, the United States and Great Britain took 
275,000 German and Italian soldiers into captivity). 
 18 “The ICRC monitors and assesses detainees’ conditions of detention and 
treatment by sending trained staff to visit places of detention, talk with the authori-
ties concerned, hold private interviews with detainees/prisoners and prepare an 
overall analysis of their findings.  ICRC findings, assessments and related recommen-
dations are discussed with the authorities at the appropriate levels.”  INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF RED CROSS, ICRC ANNUAL REPORT 2005, Jan. 6, 2006, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList125/1C6C94A33EA24A59C1257
18100393DBA.  “In 2005, the ICRC visited more than 500,000 prisoners of war and 
detainees in more than 80 countries.”  International Committee of the Red Cross, 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList2/ICRC_Activities?OpenDocume
nt (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
“Visiting people deprived of their freedom in connection with conflict 
is a core protection task of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC). . . .  During the First and Second World Wars, countless 
numbers of prisoners—whether American, British, French, German or 
of other nationalities—benefited from these visits, and from the dis-
patch of parcels and messages from home.  This work continues today, 
for example through the visits to prisoners of war taken in the conflict 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, or in the Western Sahara.” 
International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Visits to Persons Deprived of their Free-
dom: An Internationally Mandated Task, Implemented Worldwide, http://www.icrc.org/ 
Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JRME?OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 19 See Mayer, supra note 14, at 107.  Citizens of various countries have allegedly 
been rendered to many different places.  See, e.g., id. (Mahar Arar, a Canadian citi-
zen, was allegedly rendered from New York’s JFK Airport to Syria); Whitlock, supra 
note 1 (German citizen Khaled El-Masri was allegedly rendered from the Balkans to 
Afghanistan, and returned four months later when captors realized he was not the 
correct al-Qaeda suspect); Dana Priest, Help From France Key in Covert Operations, 
WASH. POST, July 3, 2005, at A1 (German suspected of being European al-Qaeda 
leader held in France as he was about to switch planes); Douglas Jehl & David Johns-
ton, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at 11 
(Mamdouh Habib, an Egyptian-born Australian, was rendered from Pakistan to 
Egypt, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo, and eventually was released). 
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The Bush Administration has not used rendition on American 
citizens accused of terrorism. For them, the criminal justice system 
remains a primary mode of detention.  Although two American citi-
zens, Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, were held in military brigs as “en-
emy combatants” in a “global struggle on terror,” American rendi-
tions have so far only been conducted on non-U.S. citizens. 
But whatever the scope of the rendition program or the nation-
ality of the person rendered, each rendition is significant to the per-
son transferred, and to his family, friends, and acquaintances.  For 
this reason, rendition should be subject to scrutiny.  Each rendition 
has the potential to be a case of mistaken identity or a false accusa-
tion.  Each rendition takes us farther away from the checks and bal-
ances of the criminal justice system and into the shadows of black op-
erations and secret sites.  Perhaps for these reasons, another former 
CIA official, less in step with the prevailing sentiment at the CIA, has 
called the rendition program “an abomination.”20
This Article attempts to answer three aspects to one basic ques-
tion about rendition.  First, may the United States, while respecting 
and complying with the rule of law, engage in snatches or renditions?  
Second, may the United States take a person suspected of being in-
volved in terrorism from another jurisdiction with (or without) that 
jurisdiction’s consent and transfer him to a third jurisdiction for in-
terrogation?  Finally, may the United States do what the media al-
leged it did to Abu Omar? 
This Article does not, however, discuss in depth nor formulate 
an opinion on at least four other issues concerning rendition.  First, 
other than by mentioning the debate, I do not spend much time as-
sessing the policy arguments for and against rendition.21  Second, I 
stay neutral as to whether the President, if necessary, may use com-
mander-in-chief powers to overrule any domestic or international law 
that would otherwise stand in the way of irregular rendition as a part 
of the strategy against terrorism.22  Third, I do not fully explore the 
differences in three levels of interrogation: (1) methods that are ac-
ceptably used on criminal defendants; (2) methods that constitute 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading (“CID”) treatment; and (3) methods 
 20 Mayer, supra note 14, at 106–07. 
 21 Thus, I am not opposed to a policy that would preclude rendition because of 
the perceived damage it causes to our self-image and to our international reputation. 
 22 Compare Yoo, supra note 17 (arguing that the President’s commander-in-chief 
powers can trump certain provisions of treaties such as the Convention Against Tor-
ture), with Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 
90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004) (arguing that the President does not have the power 
unilaterally to violate treaties). 
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that constitute torture.  I accept prevailing views and common sense 
on what constitutes an affront to due process and on what constitutes 
CID and torture.  Fourth, even though the Bush Administration has 
sometimes defined torture in the most restricted way, for present 
purposes, I take at face value their pronouncements that terrorism 
suspects are not tortured in United States custody and are not trans-
ferred to other jurisdictions to be tortured.23  Even so, mindful of po-
tential evidence that rebuts the Bush Administration’s claims, I dare 
to enter a gray zone to determine whether irregular rendition can be 
made regular and legal through assurances from third countries—
Egypt in Abu Omar’s case—and through monitoring and oversight by 
American officials on the conditions and treatment of rendered sus-
pects. 
As much as possible, I try to leave rhetoric behind to delve into 
questions of law.  The practice of rendition is something that goes 
beyond political parties.  Readers who are extremely troubled by the 
policy of rendition may view my analysis as a retrospective on the 
Bush Administration’s past practices.  They may describe my project 
as history.  Less troubled readers, on the other hand, may be willing 
to proceed by leaving policy to policymakers and legal analysis to law-
yers. 
Respecting academic conventions on form, I proceed with delib-
erate pace through several movements in this Article.  Part I adds 
precision to the use of the term “irregular rendition,” explaining my 
preference for this term over “snatches” and “extraordinary rendi-
tion.”24  Part II assesses domestic and international laws that affect ir-
regular rendition.25  Here, the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment (“CAT”)26 is of particular importance.  While the term ir-
regular rendition usually refers to situations in which suspects are 
sent to countries with questionable human rights records, I will show 
that some irregular renditions are clearly legal.  For example, not 
even Human Rights Watch should complain if the United States ren-
ders a Swiss citizen captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan back to 
Switzerland.  Part III assesses various types of assurances that the 
 23 U.S. Department of State, Rice Says United States Does Not Torture Terrorists (Dec. 
5, 2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2005/Dec/05-762606.html. 
 24  See infra Part I. 
 25 See infra Part II. 
 26 G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, ¶ 39, U.N. GAOR, 39th Session, Supp. No. 51, U.N. 
Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10. 1984), available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html 
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. 
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United States could obtain from the receiving countries before con-
ducting an irregular rendition.27  The assurances could be either oral 
or written and could come from heads of state, through diplomatic 
channels of an ambassador or a foreign minister, or from intelligence 
officials.  Part IV assesses the role that post-transfer monitoring and 
oversight could play in making close calls on irregular rendition.28  
Part V, working within what I believe is an intelligence paradigm, lays 
out several scenarios in which a suspect is rendered to another juris-
diction.29  To correlate with the analysis from Part II, some countries 
mentioned as recipients of rendered suspects are divided into three 
groups.  Most of the attention is thus focused on countries to which 
rendition would be permissible but potentially problematic. 
My conclusion is that with care and caution irregular rendition 
can be carried out under the law.  The way I reach this conclusion 
may disappoint leading voices in the broader debate about counter-
terrorism.  At one end, those who have a broad view of executive 
power might accuse me of micro-management.  At the other end, 
those who trumpet individual liberty might accuse me of heartless-
ness far worse than micro-management.  Such accusations from both 
sides of the debate should serve as a reassurance, however, that I have 
made some progress in finding a reasonable position in the middle 
on a thorny issue in counter-terrorism. 
I. DEFINITIONS 
“Snatch” is a colloquial term used to describe the process of 
bringing people into the American rendition program.  It has been 
defined as “to seize by a sudden or hasty grasp” or “to kidnap.”30  This 
term is often used by law enforcement officers and intelligence offi-
cials.  For instance, a former counter-terrorism czar, Richard Clarke, 
uses the term.31  I try to avoid the term as a reminder of the serious-
ness of our subject: a government’s decision to put a human being in 
a cage and to transfer him to another cage for rough treatment.  
Similarly, I avoid the term “extraordinary rendition” because it has 
become popular in the media as a symbol for torture and other 
wrongdoing.32
 27 See infra Part III. 
 28 See infra Part IV.  
 29 See infra Part V. 
 30 RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1807 (3d ed. 2001). 
 31 See RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES 143 (2004). 
 32 Other academic authors also prefer the term irregular over extraordinary.  See, 
e.g., STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 851 (3d ed. 2002) (“Rendition is 
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“Regular” is an appropriate term for starting a neutral analysis of 
American practices.  This term has been defined as “evenly or uni-
formly arranged” and “characterized by . . . uniform procedure.”33  By 
starting with this term, I easily establish a duality between regular and 
irregular practices.  Irregular rendition is separate from transfers 
pursuant to a treaty.  Renditions based on a treaty are known as ex-
traditions.  They involve the courts and the foreign ministries in send-
ing and receiving countries, and deserve the label of “regular rendi-
tion.”34  In contrast, “irregular renditions” are not based on a treaty, 
and involve the secret transfer of a foreign terrorism suspect from 
United States custody to other countries for detention and interroga-
tion.  These transfers may or may not be done by a written agree-
ment. 
I focus on irregular renditions in which the United States is the 
country that sends terrorism suspects to another country.  In theory 
and in practice, there are many other scenarios of irregular rendi-
tion: cases in which the United States is the receiving country or cases 
when rendition occurs between two other countries.  The media at-
tention on American practices—and the focus of this Article—should 
not lead to a skewed conclusion that the United States is the only 
country in the rendition business.  Renditions by other countries 
have been scrutinized by the European Court of Human Rights and 
by human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch.35  Swe-
den, for example, has been criticized for denying asylum to two puta-
tive terrorists, Ahmed Agiza and Muhammed Zery, and for expelling 
them to Egypt.36 However, no matter what countries are involved, 
what terms are used, or what safeguards are put in place, critics of ir-
regular rendition should understand that we move forward with dark 
hoods over our heads.  The hoods represent the possibility that, de-
spite our best efforts, we may not have all the facts.  What we are do-
ing might be immoral or based on mistaken identity.  The govern-
irregular when [an] individual [] [is] taken from one country to another as a crimi-
nal suspect against [his] free will and without consent of the country from which [he 
is] taken.” (citing JORDAN PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 436 (2d ed. 
2000)). 
 33 WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra note 30, at 1624. 
 34 For a discussion of international extradition, see 31A AM. JUR. 2D Extradition § 
12 (2005). 
 35 See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights News: Torture and Abuse, 
http://www.hrw.org/doc/?t=torture (last visited August 24, 2006). 
 36 Craig Whitlock, New Swedish Documents Illuminate CIA Action; Probe Finds ‘Rendi-
tion’ of Terror Suspects Illegal, WASH. POST, May 21, 2005, at A1. 
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ment does not want us to know everything, and perfection is for 
higher powers. 
Whether the topic is irregular rendition or something else, na-
tional security is not the only area that deals with ambiguity in Ameri-
can law.  Analogous to the difficulties that American officials face in 
deciding whether and how to render terrorism suspects are the diffi-
culties that American executives face in deciding how to sell their 
products and services around the world.  The Iranian trade sanctions, 
for example, prevent Halliburton from selling petroleum products to 
Iran.37  Nothing prevents Halliburton, however, from selling such 
products to France.  Yet, Halliburton may not sell to a French com-
pany if there is a strong likelihood that those products will, in turn, 
be sold to Iran.38  This would be an illegal end-run around the Ira-
nian sanctions.  In the corporate sphere, Halliburton protects itself 
from liability by conducting “due diligence,” seeking oral and written 
assurances, and with monitoring and oversight.39  In the intelligence 
sphere, even though officials at the CIA do not necessarily label their 
practices “due diligence,” they protect themselves from liability in the 
same manner. 
II.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Commander-in-Chief Powers 
The media have revealed, in part, the Bush Administration’s 
practice of irregular rendition.40  Only a small group of American of-
 37 See 15 C.F.R. § 746.7 (2006); DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FOREIGN ASSETS 
CONTROL REGULATIONS FOR EXPORTERS AND IMPORTERS 20 (2006), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/regulations/t11facei.pdf  
(“[G]oods, technology . . . or services may not be exported, reexported, sold or sup-
plied, directly or indirectly, from the United States . . . to Iran.”). 
 38 See 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2006) (export not permitted if person has “knowledge 
or reason to know” that export would be “directly or indirectly supplied, trans-
shipped, or reexported exclusively or predominately to Iran”); see 50 U.S.C.S. § 1705 
(LexisNexis 2006) (placing civil penalties on individuals and companies who “know-
ingly participate[]” in a violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA)); United States v. Reyes, 270 F.3d 1158, 1170 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding 
that defendant willfully violated IEEPA by having knowledge that his Swiss customer 
might forward military aircraft parts to Iran). 
 39 Federal export regulations of certain types of technology and software explic-
itly require a “written assurance . . . in the form of a letter or any other written com-
munication.”  15 C.F.R. § 740.6(a)(3) (2006). 
 40 See Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 4, 2005, at A1; Dana Priest, CIA, White House Defend Transfers of Terror Suspects, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2005, at A7; Dana Priest, CIA's Assurances on Transferred Suspects 
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ficials inside “compartments” of classified information, however, 
knows the full truth about irregular rendition.41  The rhetoric from 
the President and his advisors makes clear that they do not believe 
“quaint” legal theories should impede getting tough with terrorists.42  
For example, about a year after September 11, a top CIA official, 
Cofer Black, thrust his chin out and proudly stated: “[t]here was ‘be-
fore’ 9/11 and ‘after’ 9/11.  After 9/11, the gloves came off.”43  That 
statement was as much fact as provocation.  At less candid moments, 
apologists for the administration could argue that irregular rendition 
moves suspects to safer locations for interrogation and puts the sus-
pects closer to interrogators who speak their language and under-
stand their culture.  Nonetheless, the popular perception, created by 
the candor of Cofer Black and others, is that suspects are rendered to 
locations where there are not so many checks on aggressive interro-
gation—to places where the gloves more easily come off. 
To learn much of anything about the rendition program is a 
struggle.  Those without clearances are left to speculate and infer.  
Although it is fair to speculate that the Bush Administration only em-
barked on its rendition policy or made specific rendition decisions 
after receiving legal guidance from lawyers with access to the classi-
fied facts, nothing has been revealed to the public.  That is, unlike 
the infamous “torture” memo of August 2002 concerning interroga-
tion practices, memoranda and letters from the Office of Legal 
Counsel on irregular rendition, if any exist, have not leaked to the 
public. 44
Doubted, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2005, at A1; Dana Priest & Joe Stephens, Secret World of 
U.S. Interrogation, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at A1. 
 41 Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 
2005, at A1. 
 42 See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, on the 
Geneva Conventions and Prisoners of War to George W. Bush, the President of the 
United States, 2–3 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
4999148/site/newsweek (arguing that the need for flexibility in the war on terror 
trumps traditional reasons for applying the Geneva Conventions to al-Qaeda and 
Taliban prisoners). 
 43 Investigation of September 11 Failures: Hearing Before a Joint Session of the Senate and 
House Intelligence Committees, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Cofer Black, Dir. of 
the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center), available at 2002 WL 31151504; see also John 
Barry, Michael Hirsh, and Michael Isikoff, The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 
2004, 1, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4989436/site/newsweek/. 
 44 See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, on Stan-
dards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to George W. 
Bush, the President of the United States 1 (Aug 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/ 
dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf [hereinafter Torture Memorandum]; Dana Priest 
& R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture, WASH. POST, June 8, 
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In search of details about the rendition program, I write outside 
the in camera setting of the official analysis.  I cannot assess all the of-
ficial arguments because I am not privy to them.  Similarly, lawyers in 
the Bush Administration cannot comment on my analysis because of 
their obligations to keep the confidences of their client.  Therefore, 
the current officials and this former official are on parallel tracks.  As 
citizens, we should hope that their analysis exceeds what I have done, 
that they too have been honest in dealing with the difficult questions. 
For a glimpse into the official guidance, one can infer from the 
academic comments that former advisers have made.  For instance, 
Professor John Yoo, since leaving the Bush Administration as a key 
adviser, has argued that no law, not even the CAT, stands in the way 
of irregular rendition.45  Professor Yoo argues that nothing prevents 
the United States from taking control of a terrorism suspect in a 
country outside the United States and rendering the suspect to an-
other country outside the United States.46  His argument contains 
several strands.  First, whatever gets in the way of the executive’s use 
of irregular rendition in transferring terrorists constitutes an uncon-
stitutional interference with the President’s commander-in-chief 
powers during an armed conflict.47  Second, the CAT is not self-
executing.48  Third, even if the CAT were self-executing, it only ap-
plies to renditions from United States territory to other countries.49  
To buttress this argument that the CAT does not have extra-territorial 
effect, Professor Yoo refers to Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.50 in 
which the Supreme Court held that the Refugee Convention only 
applied to conduct within United States territory.51  Fourth, Professor 
Yoo posits that even if there is customary international law against 
such transfers, executive decisions to render terrorism suspects trump 
that law.52
To demonstrate that transfers of people during a conflict have 
been the exclusive domain of the executive branch, Professor Yoo 
2004, at A1.  Some members of Congress still believe that the Office of Legal Counsel 
did offer some guidance on rendition in a March 13, 2002 memorandum.  See Letter 
from Sen. Patrick Leahy to Alberto R. Gonzalez, Counsel to the President (Jan. 4, 
2005), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200501/010405.html. 
 45 Yoo, supra note 17, at 1229–30. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 1230. 
 48 Id. at 1228. 
 49 Id. at 1229. 
 50 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
 51 Id. at 156. 
 52 Yoo, supra note 17, at 1230 n.201. 
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spends several pages on how prisoners of war were handled in the 
Revolutionary War, the Quasi-War with France, the War of 1812, the 
Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, 
the Interwar Period, World War II, Vietnam, Panama, and the Gulf 
War.53  For his own purposes, Professor Yoo picks and chooses when 
suspected terrorists should be treated as POWs.  For the Geneva Con-
ventions, Professor Yoo believes that suspected terrorists are not enti-
tled to be treated as POWs.54  But for irregular rendition, he believes 
they can be treated like prisoners from other armed conflicts.55  No-
where does he make explicit the premise that a war on terrorism is 
similar enough to prior wars for the past precedents to apply.  That 
premise is implicit in his analysis.  The most relevant comparison Pro-
fessor Yoo makes is not his list of wars, but a list for the handling of 
prisoners who were not entitled to “formal” POW treatment.56  How-
ever, rather than cover this point in the text, he relegates it to a foot-
note.57
It is apparent that Professor Yoo’s arguments continue to influ-
ence the Bush Administration.  In 2006, John Bellinger, the State 
Department’s legal advisor, in response to questions from the com-
mittee that supervises the CAT, stated: “[n]either the text of the Con-
vention, its negotiating history, nor the U.S. record of ratification 
supports a view that Article 3 of the CAT applies to persons outside 
the territory of the United States.”58  This argument, in different 
clothes, is Professor Yoo’s argument about the Convention’s lack of 
extra-territorial effect.  Although Mr. Bellinger refers to the Sale deci-
sion in his other comments, he does not explicitly credit Professor 
Yoo.  Yoo’s influence is apparent nonetheless. 
Despite the protests against Professor Yoo and despite his un-
popularity with human rights organizations, it is clear that many 
more officials than Mr. Bellinger share his views.59  Professor Yoo, in 
 53 Id. at 1206–22. 
 54 See John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 207, 
215–16 (2003). 
 55 See Yoo, supra note 17, at 1221–22. 
 56 Id. at 1222. 
 57 See id. at 1222 n.167 (stating that “[h]istorical practice firmly supports the 
power of the President to transfer and otherwise dispose of the liberty of all individu-
als captured incident to military operations, and not merely those individuals who 
may technically be classified as prisoners of war under relevant treaties”). 
 58 U.S. Dep’t of State, List of Issues to be Considered During the Examination of the Sec-
ond Periodic Report of the United States of America: Response of the United States of America, 
at 32 (April 28, 2006), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/68662.pdf. 
 59 Responses of Alberto Gonzalez, Nominee to be Attorney General, to the Writ-
ten Supplemental Questions of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Response to  
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line with the Bush Administration, suggests that our counter-
terrorism policies cannot operate within a criminal law paradigm.60  
That paradigm has shifted, according to the Bush Administration, 
from “prosecution” to “prevention.”61  While I agree that full process 
cannot be given to all suspected terrorists, I do not believe that we ex-
ist in a binary world where the laws of war are the only alternative.  
Perhaps the criminal justice model can be blended with the military 
model; a blended form of tribunal to prosecute terrorism suspects is 
one possibility. 
Concerning irregular rendition, let us imagine that White House 
officials and CIA policymakers insist on more flexibility for opera-
tions.  Behind the scenes, they may not be willing to gamble on ag-
gressive interpretations of American and international law.  They may 
not completely follow Professor Yoo.  Out of caution about getting 
too close to the line of illegality or for policy reasons, the executive 
branch may ask its lawyers to assume that at least one provision of law, 
the CAT, applies to rendition.  Similarly, let us imagine a situation in 
which the executive detains a non-U.S. citizen on U.S. territory far 
away from the front lines in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Outside the im-
migration laws and the extradition process, the executive may pro-
pose, quickly and secretly, to render the putative terrorist elsewhere.  
In such cases, Professor Yoo’s provocative views about the full scope 
of executive power may not solve all problems, and an analysis of the 
CAT will be necessary.62
Question 11 (January 25, 2005), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
Gonzales.Kennedy.supp.pdf. 
 60 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 17, at 1193, 1198 (“If September 11 was not an act of 
war, then the United States might be limited to the tools of the criminal justice sys-
tem in its efforts to fight the Qaeda terrorist organization . . . terrorist organizations 
such as al Qaeda have now acquired the military power that once only rested in the 
hands of nation-states. That change must bring terrorist networks within the laws of 
war.”). 
 61 Tim Golden, Domestic Surveillance: The Advocate; A Junior Aide had a Big Role in 
Terror Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A1 (describing Professor Yoo as a “critical 
player” in the Bush Administration’s legal response to the terrorist threat); Tim 
Golden, Threats and Responses: Tough Justice; After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at 11 (summarizing comments and statements by 
various members of White House counsel, which reflect a change to more aggressive 
and “forward-leaning” counter-terrorism policies, in the face of devastating terrorist 
attacks). 
 62 Since this Article chooses to explore the role of assurances and monitoring in 
depth, I do not discuss other international conventions that may apply, that is, the 
Geneva Conventions or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  I 
assume that if irregular rendition is made legal under the CAT it is legal under these 
other conventions and under customary international law.  Testing that assumption 
would take me far outside the scope of this Article.  Further, accepting one of Profes-
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B. The Convention Against Torture 
i. Historical Framework 
The practice of torture goes back to the beginning of human 
history.63  The efforts to ban torture do not go back as far.  Torture 
has been categorized not only as a blatant crime against human 
rights, but the “most effective weapon against democracy.”64  Even 
without a specific treaty on torture, reasonable arguments have been 
made that torture violates the universal law of nations, making the 
ban on torture jus cogens under international law.65  Therefore, inter-
national treaties play a double role: supporting jus cogens and creating 
prohibitions that have not yet reached a level of international con-
sensus. 
The United Nations adopted and opened the CAT for signature 
on December 10, 1984.66  The CAT is part of the international com-
munity’s broader efforts to end barbarism in the world.  The CAT 
builds on an international law foundation that was laid by the Hague 
Convention on the laws of war67 and the Geneva Conventions on the 
sor Chesney’s conclusions about transfers from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, I do not 
conduct a separate analysis of the detainees’ due process rights.  See Robert Chesney, 
Leaving Guantanamo: The Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 
657, 744 (2006) (“[T]here is no reason to believe that the requirements of substan-
tive due process would be any more or less forgiving than those of CAT.”). 
 63 See, e.g., Oswaldo Estrada, Human Dignity and the Convention Against Torture: Has 
the Burden of Proof Become Heavier than Originally Intended?, 3 REGENT J. INT’L L. 87, 90 
(2005); Daniel Rothberg, “What we have seen has been terrible”; Public Presentational Tor-
ture and the Communicative Logic of State Terror, 67 ALB. L. REV. 465, 485 (2003).
 64 144 CONG. REC. S3013-01 (April 1, 1998) (remarks given by Senator Paul 
Wellstone to the United States Senate on the United Nations International Day in 
Support of Victims of Torture). 
 65 See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993) (stating that the international prohibi-
tion of official torture has attained the force of a jus cogens norm).  See generally Erika 
de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of jus cogens and its implica-
tions for National and Customary Law, 15 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 97, 98 (2004) (stating that 
the prohibition against torture is a peremptory norm, or jus cogens principle); Karen 
Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 
HASTINGS INT’L AND COMP. L. REV. 411, 437–39 (1989) (“Torture is widely recognized 
as contravening jus cogens.”). 
 66 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Con-
vention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, http://www.ohchr.org/ 
english/countries/ratification/9.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Conven-
tion Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations].  As of 2005, seventy-four countries 
have signed the convention.  Id. 
 67 Hague Convention (IV), Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
and Annex: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. I, IV, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539.
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treatment of combatants and non-combatants during war.68  As a rela-
tively new effort at international rulemaking by the United Nations, 
the CAT expresses the will of the international community and the 
signatories to the convention to end both torture and the cruel, in-
human, or degrading treatment of people around the world.69
President Ronald Reagan signed the CAT on April 18, 1988.70  
The United States Senate ratified it on October 27, 1990.71  The Sen-
ate, however, did so with a number of “understandings” and “declara-
tions.”  Thus, the United States Senate attempted to make clear that 
the provisions of Articles One through Sixteen were not self-
executing for purposes of U.S. domestic law.72  For my purposes, 
rather than digress into a discussion of whether the United States 
Senate had the right to ratify subject to these particular understand-
ings and declarations, I assume they were valid.  Therefore, they can 
serve as benchmarks in determining United States obligations under 
the CAT.73
Although it is common to abbreviate the Convention as “CAT,” 
one should not forget that the rest of the Convention’s title addresses 
 68 See e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287. 
 69 Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at preamble.  Torture practices 
were first prohibited in 1948 by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in 
1951 by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide.  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10  1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.  This 
concept was reaffirmed in 1966 by the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.  G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N.  
Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/ 
englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty6.asp. 
 70 134 CONG. REC. S6464-02 (May 23, 1988). 
 71 136 CONG. REC. S17486, S17491-2 (Oct. 27, 1990) [hereinafter United States 
Convention Against Torture Ratification History].  Because the United States did not de-
posit the instrument of ratification with the United Nations until October 21, 1994, 
the United States’ obligations under the Convention did not take effect until thirty 
days later.  Ali v. Reno, 237 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 72 United States Convention Against Torture Ratification History, supra note 71.  
The Senate’s primary reservation was that any obligation to prevent torture goes only 
as far as the constitutional requirements existing under the Fifth, Eighth, and Four-
teenth Amendments.  Id. 
 73 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Section 2, Article 18 of 1969 
allows a State ratifying a treaty to make “reservations” unilaterally modifying the legal 
effect of the treaty, so long as the reservation is neither prohibited by, nor inconsis-
tent with, the purpose of the treaty.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/ 
texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 
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“other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”  In 
short, the CAT addresses two levels of conduct: torture and CID.  
These two levels overlap with some provisions of American law.  For 
instance, our Constitution forbids both torture and CID on criminal 
defendants, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice forbids torture 
and CID on detainees of the United States military.74
The CAT, in basic terms, outlaws torture and requires signato-
ries to enact and to enforce criminal laws in their nations against tor-
ture.75  According to one non-governmental organization that tracks 
the world’s progress in outlawing torture, the CAT is the “most pro-
tective of any of the treaties to which the United States is a party,” 
protecting even against harmful expulsion and extradition.76  There-
fore, hopes for better treatment of candidates for rendition largely 
rest on the specific provisions of the CAT. 
ii. Specific Articles 
Article One of the Convention defines torture as “any act by 
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inten-
tionally inflicted on a person” to punish, obtain information, coerce, 
or intimidate.77  This definition specifically excludes any pain and suf-
fering resulting from lawful sanctions and punishments.78  To be tor-
ture, the conduct must be an intentional infliction of pain or suffer-
ing committed by officials; it is something “perpetrated or sanctioned 
 74 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, VI; see also 10 U.S.C. § 855 (2000) (prohibiting 
punishments by court-martial involving “flogging, or by branding, marking, or tattoo-
ing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual punishment”).  The 2005 McCain 
Amendment tried to close the loophole that reportedly allowed the CIA to engage in 
CID on non-U.S. citizens outside the United States.  The McCain Amendment “pro-
hibits the ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ of anyone in the 
custody of the U.S. Government.  This provision, modeled after wording in the U.N. 
Convention Against Torture . . . is meant to overturn an administration position that 
the convention does not apply to foreigners outside the United States.”  Josh White 
& R. Jeffrey Smith, White House Aims to Block Legislation on Detainees, WASH. POST, July 
23, 2005, at A1.  The newest source of American law on interrogations of suspected 
terrorists is the Military Commissions Act of 2006.  Military Commissions Act of 2006, 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:2:./temp/~c109d7wXgE::.  
Under McCain and the MCA, the definition of CID is still tied to Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment standards. 
 75 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 4–7. 
 76 Association of the Bar of the City of New York & Center for Human Rights and 
Global Justice, Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to "Extraordi-
nary Renditions," at 32 (2005), available at http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/ 
TortureByProxy.pdf [hereinafter Torture By Proxy]. 
 77 Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 1. 
 78 Id. 
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by a nation’s authorities.”79  While the definition of torture should 
not be artificially limited, it should not be so expansive that it merges 
into criminal justice standards on interrogation or into the CAT’s 
separate definition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.  A 
balance is necessary. 
Article Two of the CAT makes clear that the ban on torture ap-
plies at all times and under all circumstances: “[n]o exceptional cir-
cumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, in-
ternal political instability or any other public emergency, may be 
invoked as a justification of torture.”80  In short, the ban on torture is 
absolute and not subject to any exceptions. 
Article Three of the CAT is most relevant to irregular rendition.  
This article requires that no country “expel, return (‘refouler’) or ex-
tradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds 
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to tor-
ture.”81  It is significant that CID is not mentioned in this article and 
that a parallel provision related to CID does not exist under the Con-
vention.82  As such, the definition on which the legality of irregular 
rendition turns is only the likelihood of torture. 
Since the Senate viewed many of the CAT’s provisions as not be-
ing self-executing, the United States took actions after ratification to 
fulfill its commitments under the treaty.  In 1994, Congress barred 
torture outside the United States by United States citizens and United 
States agencies.83  In doing so, the new federal statute borrowed the 
definition of torture from the CAT.84  In addition, the statute defines 
severe mental pain or suffering as “prolonged mental harm” caused 
by any of the following: intentional severe physical pain or suffering; 
use of or threat of mind-altering substances or anything else that can 
greatly alter sense or personality; threat of imminent death; or the 
 79 Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 80 Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 2. 
 81 Id. at art. 3. 
 82 Days before the McCain Amendment passed, Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice declared that the United States, as a matter of policy, does not engage in CID.  
See Joel Brinkley, Rice Appears to Reassure Some Europeans on Treatment of Terror Detainees, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at A6.  What is still not clear is whether the Bush Admini-
stration has made a corresponding change in policy to preclude renditions when 
there are substantial grounds for believing that the suspect is in danger of CID. 
 83 18 U.S.C.S. § 2340A (LexisNexis 2006).  The statute not only operates against 
U.S. citizens for acts of torture committed outside the United States, but also extends 
its jurisdiction over alleged offenders present in the U.S. regardless of the offenders’ 
or victims’ citizenship.  Id. 
 84 18 U.S.C.S. § 2340(1) (LexisNexis 2006). 
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threat of putting someone else in any of these situations.85  The stat-
ute, however, does not define “severe physical pain” and does not 
give much guidance on determining what pain is severe enough for 
the statute to apply.  For actions within the United States, a statute 
was not deemed necessary because torture was already disallowed un-
der the United States Constitution and under various state and fed-
eral statutes.86
The CAT’s definition of torture is open to different interpreta-
tions.  Severe pain or suffering is often interpreted only to prohibit 
acts so extreme that they are condemned world-wide.87  The State 
Department, in one interpretation, states that protection from tor-
ture under the CAT is “usually reserved for extreme, deliberate, and 
unusually cruel practices.”88  Another interpretation from the Justice 
Department stated that torture requires specific intent to inflict suf-
fering “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious 
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, 
or even death.”89  The Justice Department, however, abandoned this 
controversial interpretation in time for Alberto Gonzalez and Mi-
chael Chertoff to be confirmed respectively as Attorney General and 
head of the Department of Homeland Security.90  Even so, for at least 
a year after this interpretation had been abandoned, the Bush Ad-
ministration continued to operate under stingy definitions such that 
water-boarding, namely giving the suspect the sensation of suffoca-
tion through dripping water and wet towels,91 may have been inter-
preted as being short of torture. The McCain Amendment, which 
passed at the end of 2005 as the Detainee Treatment Act, attempted 
to put an end to such practices and stinginess.  All United States 
 85 18 U.S.C.S. § 2340(2)(A)–(D) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 86 Torture has long been illegal under various state and federal laws that prohibit 
assault, battery, and murder.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 1111 (LexisNexis 2006) (defining 
and prohibiting murder); see also S. Rep. No. 103-107, at 59 (1993) (“The definition 
for ‘severe pain and mental suffering’ incorporates the understanding made by the 
Senate concerning this term.”). 
 87 President’s Message to Congress Transmitting the Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Summary and 
Analysis of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, May 23, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-200, reprinted in 
13857 U.S. Cong. Serial Set at 3. 
 88 Id. at 4. 
 89 Torture Memorandum, supra note 44, at 1. 
 90 See Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, on Legal 
Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Dec 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf. 
 91 Mayer, supra note 14, at 106. 
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agencies were prevented from engaging in torture or in cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading tactics.92  Now it is much more difficult for the 
Bush Administration to argue with a straight face that water-boarding 
is short of both torture and CID.  Bush’s lawyers are left with a contro-
versial argument that the President can trump Congress through 
commander-in-chief powers. 
As with any legal standard, some applications of Article Three 
are clear-cut while other applications are ambiguous.93  In some ir-
regular renditions, the grounds for believing that the person about to 
be expelled, returned, or extradited will be tortured are close to zero.  
Such situations, to state the obvious, do not present “substantial 
grounds.”  In other renditions, the grounds for believing that some-
one will be tortured are close to 100%.  Such situations, just as obvi-
ously, present substantial grounds.  Cases between the two obvious 
poles require further analysis. 
The CAT neither defines “substantial grounds” nor qualifies Ar-
ticle Three.  The United States Senate, perhaps aware of Article 
Three’s ambiguity, added a specific understanding of Article Three 
upon ratification.94  The Senate’s understanding was that “substantial 
grounds for believing” means “more likely than not.”95  What ap-
peared to be a clarification, however, really traded one sort of ambi-
guity for another.  As a result, the Senate’s understanding may have 
actually watered down the CAT’s requirement, making it easier to be 
in compliance on renditions.96  This assumes that “more likely than 
not” is a more lenient standard for the executive branch than “sub-
stantial grounds.”  The higher the bar for the possibility of torture, 
the more leeway the executive has with irregular rendition.  Rendi-
tion is prohibited only when the belief that the suspect will be tor-
tured in the receiving country reaches that bar. 
 92 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000dd(a) (LexisNexis 2006) 
(“No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States 
Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
 93 See infra Part II.C. 
 94 United States Convention Against Torture Ratification History, supra note 71 
 95 Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (setting the standard as “more likely than 
not” for asylum-related removal cases); Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir. 
2004);  
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 96 Contrast the CAT standard with the standard for seeking asylum in the United 
States, which only requires a “well-founded fear” of harm proving that such fear is 
reasonable rather than probable.  I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–31 
(1987) (interpreting “well-founded fear of persecution” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) 
(2000)). 
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The second part of Article Three makes clear that a rendition’s 
legality is tied to specific facts and to a totality of circumstances.  It 
states that “[f]or the purpose of determining whether there are such 
grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all rele-
vant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the 
State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass vio-
lations of human rights.”97  Other than its short list of “gross, flagrant, 
or mass violations,” Article Three does not provide much guidance 
on what those “relevant considerations” are. 
As a part of the process of conforming American law to the CAT, 
the United States changed some of its provisions on extradition and 
immigration.98  In 1998, Congress required the relevant federal agen-
cies to put in place regulations “not to expel, extradite, or otherwise 
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which 
there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the per-
son is physically present in the United States.”99  This aspect of 
American law corresponds closely with the language of Article Three 
from the CAT.  Regulations were passed that applied to the role of 
the Department of Homeland Security and the Justice Department in 
transfers.100  Regulations were also passed that applied to the role of 
the State Department in transfers.101  Added up, the regulations make 
clear that Article Three principles apply to removals and extraditions 
and, thus, those regulations serve as one benchmark under American 
law. 
Yet, as noted above, my focus is on irregular renditions of people 
who are at all times outside United States territory.  I do not fully ana-
lyze transfers of people from within the United States, transfers of 
people attempting to enter or to stay in the United States through 
the immigration process, or transfers from the special jurisdiction of 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  My focus is on secret activities that the CIA 
has allegedly carried out in the shadows—in foreign countries.102  
Those transfers may involve a different benchmark. 
 97 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 3. 
 98 See, e.g., Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (“FARRA”) of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–822 (1998). 
 99 Id. 
 100 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–18, 1208.16–18 (2006). 
 101 See 22 C.F.R. § 95.2 (2006). 
 102 A cottage industry has been created for identifying airplanes involved in CIA 
renditions.  The identifications are sometimes as specific as the types of vessel and 
the tail numbers.  See Scott Shane, C.I.A. Expanding Terror Battle Under Guise of Charter 
Flights, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005, at A1. 
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Whether or not the CIA has adopted regulations to implement 
Article Three principles is classified.103  Therefore, some official ob-
servers, in line with Professor Yoo, may continue to challenge 
whether Article Three even applies to irregular renditions.  Their 
challenge might involve arguments that the CAT is not self-executing 
and that CAT’s territorial reach is limited.  Rather than debate self-
execution and territoriality, I have assumed that at least Article Three 
applies to CIA activities.  In that way, I leave more space to examine 
pre-transfer assurances and post-transfer monitoring. 
iii. Cases and Precedents 
Some people have lived to tell what they endured through al-
leged CIA renditions.  Notable examples are Khaled El-Masri, a Ger-
man rendered from Macedonia to Afghanistan, and Mamdouh 
Habib, an Australian rendered from Pakistan to Egypt.104  Both men 
have received substantial attention from the media.105  Both men 
claim that, while innocent of any connection to terrorism, they were 
mistreated in their receiving countries.106  As a result, Masri has filed a 
lawsuit against the United States.107  In addition, a Canadian named 
Maher Arar alleges that he was detained during a lay-over at Kennedy 
Airport in New York City and, after transit through Jordan, rendered 
to Syria where he was tortured.108  Arar’s case, unlike Masri’s and 
 103 I know this from the CIA’s pre-publication review of this manuscript. 
 104 See Whitlock, supra note 1; Jehl & Johnston, supra note 19. 
 105 Ian Cobain, CIA Rendition Flights: Case Studies: Seized, Held, Tortured: 6 Tell the 
Same Tale, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 6, 2005, at Home Pages 4; Tony Patterson, Germans 
Investigate CIA Kidnap of Innocent Citizen, THE INDEPENDENT, February 22, 2006, at 18; 
Farah Stockman, 7 Detainees Report Transfer to Nations that Use Torture, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, Apr.26, 2006, at A3; Nicholas Watt, US Accused of Using Gangster Tactics over 
Terror Suspects: Washington 'outsourced torture', Says Senator: Critics Attack Lack of Evidence 
in Report, THE GUARDIAN, January 25, 2006, at 14; Craig Whitlock, Probe of Detainee 
Transfer Finds Many CIA Flights, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2006, at A20. 
 106 In Masri’s case, the United States has apologized to the German Government 
for rounding up Masri by confusing him with a “known” terrorist with a similar 
name.  See Glenn Kessler, U.S. Said to Admit German’s Abduction Was an Error, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 7, 2005, at A18. 
 107 Khaled El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
 108 Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp.2d 250, 252–56 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see Complaint at 
4, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.N.D.Y. 2006) (No. CV 04 0249), available at 
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_11th/docs/ArarComplaint.pdf; Memo-
randum and Order for Dismissal at 2–9, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 
(S.N.D.Y. 2006) (No. CV 04 0249), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/ 
v2/legal/september_11th/docs/Arar_Order_21606.pdf; see also Nina Bernstein, U.S. 
Defends Detentions at Airports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005, at B1; Scott Shane, The Costs of 
Outsourcing Interrogation: A Canadian Muslim’s Long Ordeal in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 
2005, at 10. 
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Habib’s, began in the immigration context.109  But so far none of 
these men has obtained a verdict against the United States.  For such 
lawsuits to make it to a verdict, the plaintiffs have to surmount the 
steep obstacles of standing, of the political question doctrine, and of 
the government’s assertion of the state secrets evidentiary privilege.110
Although this Article does not focus on renditions in the immi-
gration context, they are useful in interpreting Article Three of the 
Convention because they provide what little law there is on how Arti-
cle Three is applied in practice.  With no Supreme Court case on 
point, lower courts in the federal system have interpreted the “more 
likely than not” standard under Article Three as requiring at least a 
fifty-one percent chance that the person will be tortured after rendi-
tion.111  In effect, they have applied the “preponderance of the evi-
dence” standard from civil cases.  Martin Lederman, formerly at the 
Justice Department and an outspoken critic of the Bush Administra-
tion, has stated an obvious problem with this standard: “The Conven-
tion only applies when you know a suspect is more likely than not to 
be tortured, but what if you kind of know? That’s not enough.”112  Mr. 
Lederman, however, does not go so far as to argue that the vagueness 
of the standard makes it unconstitutional.  After all, the preponder-
ance standard is the same one that applies to civil verdicts which of-
ten involve billions of dollars. 
Other experts have concluded that “the prohibition against re-
foulement to torture requires both an objective assessment of the 
conditions in the state to which an individual may be transferred, and 
a subjective assessment of the danger particular to the individual.”113  
This danger must be more than a “mere suspicion.”114  One definition 
does not conclude the analysis, however.  As often occurs in the in-
terpretation of statutes, definitions move from one phrase to another 
without a clear ending.  The catch phrases are a moving target.  Sub-
stantial grounds become “more likely than not.”  “More likely than 
 109 See Bernstein, supra note 108. 
 110 In fact, Arar’s lawsuit was dismissed because Arar lacked standing, the Torture 
Victim Prevention Act did not create a private right of action, and there was no sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction for a Bivens action.  The court’s decision did not even fully 
reach the political question or state secrets issues.  See Memorandum and Order for 
Dismissal, supra note 108. at 77 n.14, 85–86. 
 111 See, e.g., Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting 
“more likely than not” in relation to torture, religious, and political persecutions of 
an alien to mean fifty-one percent). 
 112 Mayer, supra note 14, at 108. 
 113 Torture By Proxy, supra note 76, at 32. 
 114 Id. 
RADSANFINAL.DOC 10/20/2006  2:06:56 PM 
2006] IRREGULAR RENDITION 23 
 
not” then becomes “credible threats” or “fifty-one percent likely” or 
more than “mere suspicion.”  Beyond repeating catch phrases, other 
methods are necessary for determining the legality of irregular rendi-
tion. 
The United States, as noted, has enacted regulations, consistent 
with the CAT, for removing aliens.115  Here, in the immigration con-
text, assurances are laid out as one explicit factor in determining the 
legality of a rendition.  To remove aliens, the Attorney General, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, determines whether the as-
surances are “sufficiently reliable.”116  What is sufficient and what is 
reliable is left to executive discretion. 
Other factors emerge from the immigration cases.  The possible 
torture in the receiving country must be “inflicted by or at the instiga-
tion of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity.”117  If the rendered suspect 
is tortured by private parties, the United States would not be respon-
sible under the CAT.  For the CAT to apply, the receiving govern-
ment must sanction or conduct the actual torture.118  To show that 
the receiving government has acquiesced in the torture is not 
straightforward.  As in other contexts, the line between private and 
public conduct is often blurred.  In this context, courts have held that 
acquiescence “is not limited to ‘actual knowledge, or willful accep-
tance’; the ‘willful blindness’ of government officials suffices” for tor-
ture.119  If torture by lower-level officials is routine, that may serve as 
evidence that higher-level officials, or the government itself, illegally 
turned its eye from torture.120
It is particularly difficult to find public action, under the CAT 
standard, when the receiving country lacks a central government that 
functions in the entire national territory.121  So, in what might appear 
a paradox, the CAT makes it easier to render to lawless areas than to 
territories under firm governmental control.  In one case, the Elev-
enth Circuit ruled that if there is no central government, the receiv-
 115 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c)(2) (1999). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 1. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Zheng v. 
Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that both “actual 
knowledge” and “willful blindness” constitute acquiescence under the CAT). 
 120 See Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 121 The Convention does protect against torture occurring under a private party’s 
control, but only to the extent that an existing government gives consent or acquies-
cence to the conduct.  Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 787. 
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ing country could not be involved in torture or could not acquiesce 
in torture; by application, the CAT did not prohibit the transfer of a 
person to Somalia.122  The Somalia case, however, only applied to the 
removal from the United States of an alien who would not be inter-
rogated in the receiving country.123
The context for terrorism suspects is different.  Unlike the re-
moval of most aliens, irregular rendition involves close cooperation 
between the sending and the receiving countries.  American rendi-
tions of terrorism suspects have two basic purposes: first, taking the 
suspect from the “battlefield,” and second, obtaining information 
from him about terrorist plots and terrorist cells.  In counter-
terrorism practice, it seems pointless for the CIA to render suspects to 
lawless areas.  That would run counter to the purposes of irregular 
rendition, especially the second purpose.  The countries that have 
been reported as recipients of rendered suspects, Egypt and Syria to 
name but two, are not like Somalia.  They have central governments 
and intelligence services that control—sometimes brutally—their en-
tire country.  They may be taking rendered suspects as a way of coop-
erating with the United States on counter-terrorism; secular regimes 
in the Middle East, including those of Egypt and Syria, may share the 
American assessment about the magnitude of the risk from al-Qaeda 
and other groups that are motivated by a radical view of Islam.  Those 
regimes may be cooperating for their own survival. 
Yet, reports that Syria has received terrorism suspects from the 
United States may suggest something more subtle about cooperation 
out of self-interest.  Even when diplomatic relations between two 
countries are strained, as they are between the United States and 
Syria, sometimes intelligence services are able to work out mutually 
beneficial deals.  That is, sometimes the relationship between spymas-
ters is quite different from the relationship between diplomats.  Not 
always do the scenes on stage correspond with what goes on off the 
stage. 
iv. Country Reports 
Although the second part of Article Three states that a “consis-
tent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights” 
should be taken “into account,”124 it does not explain what sources set 
 122 D-Muhumed v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 819–20 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 3. 
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this pattern.  Further, it does not describe the exact pattern that 
shows substantial grounds that a rendered suspect will be tortured. 
In the modern age, citizens have many sources of information to 
check on governmental activities.  Even those activities which gov-
ernments shroud as “classified information” sometimes pop out into 
the public discourse.  Thanks to the work of our own government, 
other governments, international bodies, the media, and non-
governmental organizations, citizens have many sources for assessing 
the human rights records of countries around the globe.  The reports 
about these countries, however, are not usually focused on the CAT.  
They are more general than specific. 
The United States Department of State issues annual country re-
ports that assess human rights conditions, past and present, and inci-
dents of human rights violations in various countries.125  These re-
ports are influential.  For the CAT analysis, American courts consider 
them relevant, though not solely conclusive, to the likelihood that a 
person will be tortured in the receiving country.126  A negative coun-
try report, however, does not always carry over from one government 
to another government in the same country.  In theory, a new gov-
ernment, to borrow from a criminal procedure concept, should be 
able to purge the taint of prior practices.  As one court noted, a 
change of a country’s constitution and the adoption of a better policy 
“regarding political activism, police brutality, and civil liberties,” 
might alleviate concerns about the receiving country’s human rights 
violations, including torture.127  Thus, country reports are one factor 
in the totality of the circumstances for assessing the legality of rendi-
tions under the CAT. 
Some courts have interpreted the “more likely than not” stan-
dard to require past acts of torture and “gross, flagrant, or mass viola-
tions of human rights,” which is indeed a high standard.128  In addi-
tion, for the CAT to prevent rendition, the risk of torture must be 
 125 See id. 
 126 See Zarouite v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The State Depart-
ment’s regular country reports are generally persuasive of country conditions . . . but 
are open to contradiction.”); Tissah v. Ashcroft, 107 F. App’x 369 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that State Department country reports detailing torture of detainees were 
relevant indicator of conditions in country). 
 127 Kourteva v. I.N.S., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that 
policies changed in Bulgaria when the government shifted from communists to so-
cialist-democrats). 
 128 Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1218–19 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 8 C.F.R. § 
208.16(c)(3)(iii–iv) (1999) (codification of this standard). 
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related to a specific person.129  For these reasons, it is possible that a 
rendition could be legal in the face of abuses in the receiving coun-
try.  The more tenuous the evidence of past human rights violations, 
the weaker the link between general conditions and the person being 
considered for rendition, the more likely the person can be rendered 
in compliance with the CAT.130  In short, a “credible” threat of future 
torture of a specific person must exist for the CAT to apply.131  Thus, 
the CAT standard looks forward. 
v. Commentators 
This Article is not the first to analyze provisions of the CAT that 
apply to renditions.  Various non-governmental organizations, serving 
as sound secondary sources on the CAT, have already assessed the le-
gality of America’s secret rendition program.132  These assessments, 
however, whether by the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York (the “City Bar”) or by Human Rights Watch, tend to substitute 
policy preferences for legal analysis. 
The City Bar defines “extraordinary rendition” as a transfer from 
United States custody “to a foreign state in circumstances that make it 
more likely than not that the individual will be subjected to torture or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”133  Although Article Three 
of the CAT only refers to the likelihood of torture, the City Bar uses 
“torture” and “cruel, inhuman, or degrading” as interchangeable 
concepts.  By those means, the City Bar’s definition already stacks the 
deck against rendition.  Because of its distaste for the policy of rendi-
tion, the City Bar tends to state baldly that neither assurances nor 
monitoring after rendition can tip the balance toward legality under 
the CAT. 
 129 Human Rights Watch, “Empty Promises:” Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard 
Against Torture, at 4, available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/un0404/ 
diplomatic0404.pdf [hereinafter Empty Promises]. 
 130 See, e.g., Pena v. U. S. Atty. Gen., 134 F. App’x 384, 386 (11th Cir. 2005) (deny-
ing protection to alien based on anonymous death threats); Zheng v. Ashcroft, 93 F. 
App’x 370 (3d Cir. 2004) (denying protection to alien who did not introduce any evi-
dence of past torture or potential future torture). 
 131 Nuru, 404 F.3d at 1219–20. 
 132 See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Enduring Abuse: Torture and Cruel Abuse 
by the United States at Home and Abroad, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/ 
torture/torture_report.pdf (“Torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
are prohibited at all times under human rights law, even in war or when fighting ter-
rorism. . . . The prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment at all times is 
applicable to state agents under Article 16(2) of the Convention Against  
Torture. . . .”).
 133 Torture by Proxy, supra note 76, at 4. 
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The City Bar’s statements are divided into three parts. First, as-
suming that American diplomats will be involved in obtaining assur-
ances from the receiving countries, the City Bar concludes that dip-
lomats will not press hard enough to obtain proper assurances 
because of their “need to maintain diplomatic, trade, and commer-
cial relations of significance to the United States.”134  This assumes, 
without evidence, that diplomatic relations are zero-sum and that 
renditions are a lower priority for our State Department.  Second, the 
City Bar claims that the mechanisms to monitor rendition are inade-
quate.135  Rather than focus on CIA practices, however, the City Bar 
draws on negative experiences with monitoring at the Department of 
Defense.136  To the City Bar, secrecy and abuse always go hand in 
hand.  Third, the City Bar is troubled by “unfettered discretion” in 
the executive branch.137  Once again, the City Bar goes too far.  The 
executive branch has always had broad discretion across the range of 
national security issues.138  This is nothing new.  Although the CAT 
does not require judicial oversight, the City Bar is particularly trou-
bled that our courts are not involved in assessing assurances before 
suspects are transferred.139  They call this a “procedural shortcom-
ing.”140  The City Bar even claims, on thin authority, that the lack of 
judicial oversight “likely violates international law.”141
The law on irregular rendition is grounded in facts and rules.  
The law does not float with the wishful thinking of human rights or-
 134 Id. at 88–89. 
 135 Id. at 89. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 89. 
 138 The text of the Commander-in-Chief Clause of the Constitution provides some 
of the President’s authority over national security matters.  For example, on the Ex-
ecutive’s power over national security information, see the Supreme Court’s recogni-
tion in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988), that “[t]he President, 
after all, is the ‘Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.’  
His authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national secu-
rity . . . flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the President 
and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant.” (citations omitted)  
The Court also recognizes Executive authority over intelligence operations.  Totten v. 
United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875) (“[The President] was undoubtedly authorized 
during the war, as commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, to employ 
secret agents to enter the rebel lines and obtain information respecting the strength, 
resources, and movements of the enemy.”).  For the President’s power to respond to 
invasion and insurrection as commander-in-chief, see The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 
668 (1862) (“If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not 
only authorized but bound to resist force by force.”). 
 139 Torture by Proxy, supra note 76, at 89. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
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ganizations.  The fact is the CAT does not require that a person about 
to be rendered must have a hearing where he can provide independ-
ent evidence of the chances that he will be tortured in the receiving 
country.  He is not entitled to attack the adequacy of the assurances 
and the monitoring that the sending country proposes to put in 
place.  Even so, as a matter of policy, the United States may deem it 
worthwhile to provide such a hearing.  That could increase the fair-
ness and the reliability of the process related to rendition.  That is an 
option for policymakers, not a requirement, under the CAT.  Policy 
and law are not the same things. 
If the United States were tempted to go down the hearing route, 
American intelligence officials would demand various protections.  
They would insist, at a minimum, that these hearings be before ex-
ecutive officials or before a court with secret proceedings like the one 
that handles applications for national security wiretaps under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.142  For the intelligence com-
munity, transparency on irregular rendition soon loses out to secrecy.  
Whatever the variations on the hearing, intelligence officials would 
strongly oppose any process that is completely open to the public.  
The sources and methods of rendition, the diplomatic interactions 
with foreign governments, and the interactions with liaison services 
would easily take the rendition into the classified realm.  There, the 
intelligence officials would not stand for open government. 
Other groups have joined the chorus with the City Bar.  Voices 
from Human Rights Watch strike similar notes.143  The respect is mu-
tual, and the City Bar relies to a large degree on its colleague’s 
work.144  Human Rights Watch concludes that assurances and moni-
toring are “empty promises.”145  In the introduction to one report, 
Human Rights Watch states: 
[P]ost-return monitoring per definition implies a fundamental 
distrust of the formal diplomatic assurances and lack of confi-
dence in domestic mechanisms to hold perpetrators of torture ac-
countable in the countries offering such assurances.  Sending gov-
ernments would no doubt argue that post-return monitoring is 
merely a failsafe, and that they would not return anyone whom 
they genuinely believed to be at risk. But when governments and 
international organizations dispatch monitors to observe elections 
 142 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.S. § 1803 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 143 See Empty Promises, supra note 129. 
 144 See Torture by Proxy, supra note 76, at 86–88. 
 145 Indeed, the title of the Human Rights Watch report, relied on heavily by the 
City Bar of New York, includes the “empty promise” phrase.  See Empty Promises, su-
pra note 129. 
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or assess human rights they do so because they fear election fraud 
and human rights violations.  It follows that the use of post-return 
monitoring in cases of returns involving diplomatic assurances 
amounts to an acknowledgement that returnees are at risk of tor-
ture or ill-treatment.146
The world is not as tidy as Human Rights Watch would like to believe.  
Just because a person fears something does not mean that something 
exists.  In a different context, for example, the fact that a doctor or-
ders comprehensive blood tests for a patient does not prove that the 
patient has leukemia.  The tests are a precaution.  The tests are a 
means of lowering the level of uncertainty.  Sometimes fears are un-
founded or exaggerated.  Sometimes the doctors are overly cautious.  
Sometimes the tests are unnecessary.  Sometimes, to return to Hu-
man Rights Watch’s context, election monitors are dispatched to in-
crease confidence in something positive, in an election without fraud. 
Human Rights Watch allows public policy concerns to inflate its 
evaluation of legal standards.  It is correct that “mere accession to 
U.N. human rights instruments” does not guarantee a country’s 
compliance with the “obligations enshrined therein.”147  But much of 
Human Rights Watch’s report, indifferent to Article Three’s clear 
statement that the CAT only applies to the risk of torture, proceeds as 
if Article Three applied to both torture and cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading treatment.  Whether by carelessness or by design, Human 
Rights Watch blurs the Article Three standard into a higher standard: 
a certainty that the suspect will not be tortured.  Referring to work 
from the United Nations Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Watch 
states that “[b]efore a person may be returned, assurances must be 
‘unequivocal,’ that is, leaving absolutely no doubt that no torture or 
ill-treatment will occur.”148  That, however, is not how the United 
States interprets the law. 
Human Rights Watch seeks a rule that allows irregular rendition 
only if the United States is certain the receiving country will not tor-
ture the suspect.  Throughout, Human Rights Watch does not leave 
room for doubt.  But Article Three prohibits rendition only if there 
are “substantial grounds for believing” torture may occur.149  It does 
not insist on absolute knowledge.  It leaves room for doubt.  As noble 
as its work is, Human Rights Watch’s insistence on knowledge with 
“absolutely no doubt” takes the legal standard past beyond a reason-
 146 Id. at 4–5. 
 147 Id. at 14. 
 148 Id. at 7. 
 149 Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 3. 
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able doubt, past the legal standard which applies to guilt in American 
criminal trials.  Its insistence on absolute knowledge comes across as 
naïve, making it easier for hardened officials in any political admini-
stration to dismiss those expectations and recommendations. 
It does make sense to hold the executive branch to high stan-
dards.  But when standards are set too high, such expectations may 
have the paradoxical outcome of making it more difficult to bring 
about incremental improvements in the oversight on rendition.  To 
the extent that observers from Human Rights Watch base their ar-
guments on the law, they should factor in the law as it is in the United 
States rather than the law as they would like it to be here.  Perhaps 
Human Rights Watch should come down from the mountain to help 
those who are attempting to make some progress, step by step, in the 
plains and valleys of American counter-terrorism.  Substantial 
grounds for believing torture will occur, the CAT standard, is not the 
same as any possibility that torture will occur. 
More sensibly, Human Rights Watch does acknowledge the two-
part framework at the core of this Article: assurances of proper 
treatment from the receiving country and monitoring of the terror-
ism suspect after transfer.150  But more by rhetoric than by analysis, it 
sweeps away the possible adequacy of assurances and monitoring.  
According to Human Rights Watch, “[t]he widespread or systematic 
use of torture in many of the countries to which people have been re-
turned, indicates that diplomatic assurances and post-return monitor-
ing are inadequate safeguards against torture and ill treatment.”151  By 
this argument, Human Rights Watch is too pessimistic.  The past does 
not always doom the future. 
Although general conditions in a country are important to the 
CAT analysis, Article Three addresses a particular rendition of a per-
son, not rendition in the abstract.152  General conditions, while proba-
tive, do not determine the outcome on a particular rendition be-
tween intelligence services.  The CIA can render a suspect to a place 
with a horrible human rights record and deplorable prisoner prac-
tices without that suspect being tortured.  That much is a theoretical 
possibility.  When the CIA is the sender, United States law focuses on 
whether the odds are more likely than not that the receiver will tor-
 150 See Empty Promises, supra note 129, at 4. 
 151 Id. 
 152 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 3.  It is important to re-
call that the refouler, return, expulsion, or extradition to which the CAT refers in-
volves “a person” and the likelihood that “he” will be tortured rather than any 
broadly applied condemnation of a nation’s human rights record.  Id. 
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ture the suspect.153  This one standard from Article Three anchors the 
law on irregular rendition. 
Before any further examination of Article Three, as a reminder, 
it is useful to turn the analysis around to United States practices.  
Separate from the abuses that have occurred in our state and federal 
prisons, separate from the mistreatment that has occurred in our 
military detention facilities such as Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, it 
still seems likely that other countries can render persons to the 
United States consistent with their CAT obligations.  Surely, the City 
Bar and Human Rights Watch are not so adamant to take the United 
States permanently off the receiving list for regular and irregular 
renditions.  To America’s credit, rather than tolerate abuses and mis-
treatment, we investigate them.154  We attempt to prosecute the 
wrongdoers.155  That is the way we stay within the rule of law.  That is 
our redemption. 
C. Clear-Cut Cases 
Without digging any deeper into statutes, legislative history, 
commentary, or court cases, one can tether the analysis of irregular 
rendition to two clear-cut examples: the first in which there are not 
substantial grounds for believing torture will occur, and the second in 
which there are substantial grounds, no matter the assurances and 
the monitoring.  Rather than parse language from legal texts, one 
can provide an example of a rendition that is clearly legal and an-
other example of a rendition that is clearly illegal.  These examples, 
in turn, can be used as analogies to interpret actual practices of ren-
dition. 
i. Safe Haven 
Imagine, for example, that during a raid in Afghanistan, Ameri-
can forces capture a blond, blue-eyed man of about thirty who had 
been fighting on the side of the Taliban.  The captive speaks English 
well, but with a German accent.  He does not have a passport or any 
other form of identification on him.  He has a long beard and the 
pungent odor of someone who has not bathed in weeks.  In response 
to questioning from United States military intelligence officials, who 
 153 See United States Convention Against Torture Ratification History Reservation 
2, supra note 71, at S17492. 
 154 See, e.g., Kate Zernike, Reservist to Offer Guilty Plea in Jail Assault, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
28, 2005, at A6 (concerning prosecution of United States soldier involved in prisoner 
abuse). 
 155 See, e.g., id. 
RADSANFINAL.DOC 10/20/2006  2:06:56 PM 
32 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1 
 
quickly arrive on the scene, the captive claims to be a Swiss citizen 
from a small town near Zurich.  He says his name is Karl Rohner, and 
that he is thirty-three years old. 
The American authorities promptly inform the Swiss authorities.  
Because the Swiss do not have much of a diplomatic presence in Af-
ghanistan, the Americans go through their State Department to di-
rect inquiries to the Swiss Foreign Ministry in Berne.  The State De-
partment asks the Swiss whether they have any record of a Rohner 
that matches the captive’s age and appearance.  Rohner checks out.  
Meanwhile, during further questioning, Rohner tells his American 
captors that he came to Afghanistan on a humanitarian mission for a 
Swiss non-governmental organization.  He claims the Taliban kid-
napped him and forced him to fight on their side.  Other captives 
from the American raid, in separate questioning, confirm much of 
Rohner’s story.  Soon, lucky for Rohner, the American authorities are 
ready to release him.  For his safety, they will not release him in Af-
ghanistan, however.  The Swiss authorities say he must come home to 
apply for a new passport.  Frugal to the extreme even in matters of 
state, they ask their American friends to handle Rohner’s transport 
back to Switzerland.  But the lawyers who represent the Department 
of Defense hesitate.  They need to ensure that a quick transfer on a 
military aircraft does not violate the law.  In particular, they are con-
cerned about irregular renditions because of the CAT. 
Surely, even if Switzerland has an extradition treaty with Af-
ghanistan,156 human rights organizations and other defenders of hu-
man rights do not expect the Americans to forego an irregular rendi-
tion on these facts.  The courts in Afghanistan barely function.157  To 
the extent that they do function, their process is slow and confused.  
Their participants are at risk of attacks from the Taliban and their 
supporters.  Far away, Switzerland is a safe haven for Rohner.  Switzer-
land is his home.  Switzerland is a member of the CAT with a nearly 
impeccable human rights record.158  This scenario is thus a clear ex-
ample where irregular rendition makes good policy and good law.  
Rohner can be transferred consistent with Article Three of the CAT. 
 156 Afghanistan and Switzerland do not appear to have a bilateral extradition 
treaty or to be members of a common multinational extradition agreement.  See 
United Nations Treaty Collection, http://untreaty.un.org/English/ 
treaty.asp (last visited August 23, 2006). 
 157 See Faiz Ahmed, Judicial Reform in Afghanistan: A Case Study in the New Criminal 
Procedure Code, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 93, 102 (2005) (noting Afghani-
stan’s shortage of state-sponsored legal institutions and its difficulties in establishing 
judicial processes). 
 158 See infra Part V. 
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ii. The Lion’s Den 
For a clear boundary at the other end of the field, imagine a hy-
pothetical from the past.  Saddam Hussein, to the despair of the Iraqi 
people, is still in power.  A leading Iraqi dissident, a Kurd—call him 
Mustapha Chalabi—escapes from Iraq by walking around check-
points into Jordan.  In Amman he purchases a false passport in a dif-
ferent name.  Then he flies toward London on a British Airways 
flight.  After the flight lands at Heathrow, while he is presenting him-
self at the immigration check, he whispers into the British official’s 
ear that his passport is false.  He says he is a top Iraqi dissident and 
needs to speak to the CIA officer who he is sure must be somewhere 
on duty near the airport. 
Within a few days, while Chalabi is detained at the airport under 
joint British-American control, the American authorities confirm that 
he is indeed who he claims to be: a prominent dissident.  Chalabi 
proposes to his interrogators a covert action to kill Saddam Hussein 
and to put Chalabi in power in Iraq.  While Chalabi is in custody, a 
story, based on anonymous sources, leaks to the Financial Times.  The 
Americans, the article says, are plotting with Chalabi against Saddam 
Hussein. 
Various American agencies consult on what they should do.  
Lines of communication are opened up between Washington, D.C. 
and London.  After consultation, the intelligence professionals state 
that they have no interest in working with Chalabi.  Many of them 
had concluded, long ago, that he and his family are riddled with in-
telligence fabricators.  In addition, they realize that the American 
President, a firm believer in honesty in international relations, does 
not have an appetite or a tolerance for covert action.  The consensus, 
led by the CIA, is that it is not worth debriefing Chalabi anymore.  He 
should be sent back to Iraq.  The British do not want to keep him ei-
ther. 
For the next step, an inter-agency team of American lawyers is 
formed.  The lawyer from the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, an avid reader of law review articles and an expert on interna-
tional law, suggests that sending Chalabi back to Iraq would violate 
the CAT.  Iraq has an atrocious human rights record and, under Sad-
dam Hussein, the country was not a member of the CAT.159  The law-
 159 Iraq’s post-Saddam government has still not ratified the CAT.  See Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention Against Torture 
Ratifications and Reservations, http://www.ohchr.org/english/ 
countries/ratification/9.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2006) (in which Iraq is not listed as 
a participant). 
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yer from the CIA suggests they obtain written assurances from Sad-
dam that Chalabi will not be harmed.  If necessary, they can even ask 
Saddam to allow monitoring and inspection after Chalabi is trans-
ferred.  In response, a lawyer from the State Department argues that 
a leader who cannot be trusted to fulfill his obligations to the United 
Nations on ceasefire arrangements and on inspections cannot be 
trusted on other matters.  The State Department lawyer reminds the 
group that Saddam has a horrific record of dealing with dissidents.  
He executes them without legal process.  His atrocities include the 
poison gassing of Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War and of Kurds in 
putting down an internal uprising.  Saddam knows about Chalabi’s 
plans.  Any assurances from Saddam, even to the American President 
himself, would be worth far less than the paper they were written on. 
Surely the Americans (and the British) would be reasonable in 
concluding that a substantial risk of torture, if not a risk of death, ex-
ists if Chalabi is returned home.  The press has revealed Chalabi’s 
plotting against Saddam.  Saddam, who has a blatant disregard for in-
ternational conventions, is ruthless with dissenters.  Accordingly, this 
scenario serves as an example where irregular rendition, no matter 
the assurances, no matter the possibility of monitoring and oversight 
after the transfer, would be bad policy and bad law.  This scenario is 
the functional equivalent of Saddam promising to kill Chalabi as soon 
as the defector returned home. 
Between the two boundaries of the safe haven and the lion’s den 
are an infinite number of examples where the analysis is much more 
difficult.  That is the gray area this Article continues to explore. 
D. Legal Exposure 
Another way of exploring the legality of irregular rendition is to 
ask what, if anything, might happen to U.S. officials if they violate Ar-
ticle Three of the CAT.160  Could they be exposed to criminal prose-
cution or civil suit in the United States? 
As to criminal exposure, it is safe to assume that several officials 
at headquarters and in the field would be involved in any particular 
rendition.  The capture of Abu Omar from Milan illustrates that 
point.  The Italian magistrate, through his indictment, suggests that 
several American officials were involved in staking out Abu Omar and 
 160 The odds that the United States could assert jurisdiction over a foreign official 
are so low that any further analysis of the exposure of foreign officials does not seem 
necessary.  Further, I do not analyze the extent to which detainees in CIA custody 
may delay or prevent an irregular rendition through a writ of habeas corpus or other 
means.  The viewpoint of this section is thus after the fact of transfer. 
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capturing him.161  Such group action exposes the officers to criminal 
liability under doctrines of attempt, aiding and abetting, and con-
spiracy.162  Indeed, the media have noted that some discussions within 
the Bush Administration’s secret circle have recognized the possibility 
of group liability for irregular renditions.163  But for group liability to 
be possible, it must be connected to an underlying crime.164  To be 
illegal, attempt, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy need to be at-
tached to something specific.165
An aggressive prosecutor might build a case on the federal tor-
ture statute.166  But this prosecutor would be charting new territory.  
So far, no one has been convicted under the torture statute for con-
spiracy to torture.  Potential charges under the torture statute would 
also open up a range of possible defenses.  The indicted defendants, 
still reading from the disavowed John Yoo playbook, might argue that 
they did not have the specific intent necessary to trigger the statute.167  
Or they might say their actions were excused or justified.  Or the de-
fendants may go straight for jury nullification, recognizing that peo-
ple who have been rendered under the label of “terrorist” do not 
make appealing victims. 
Such defenses compound the complications prosecutors would 
face from dealing with the classified facts involved in any irregular 
rendition.  When the CIA operates under a blanket policy of neither 
confirming nor denying the rendition program, it is impossible for 
the parties in a criminal case to delve into the details of a particular 
rendition without treading on secrets during discovery or trial.  Al-
though the Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”)168 is de-
signed to handle some of the complications of having classified in-
formation in a criminal case, it does not necessarily resolve everything 
in the prosecutors’ favor.169  CIPA merely encourages the parties to 
 161 Id. 
 162 See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (allowing for an individual who has aided, abetted, 
counseled, commanded, induced, or procured the commission of an offense against 
the United States to be punished as a principal); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) (“If two or 
more persons conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States . . . and 
one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned.”). 
 163 See Michael Isikoff, Secret Memo—Send to Be Tortured, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 2005, at 
7. 
 164 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 165 Id. 
 166 18 U.S.C.S. § 2340A (LexisNexis 2006). 
 167 See Torture Memorandum, supra note 44, at 3. 
 168 18 U.S.C. app. § 3 (2000). 
 169 Id. 
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work toward a resolution before trial.170  The executive still has diffi-
cult choices under CIPA, and the threat of graymail still lurks behind 
the scenes.171  For prosecutors, the CIPA precedents are not too en-
couraging. 
 In the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, alleged to be part of an al-
Qaeda conspiracy, federal prosecutors worked for over four years, 
with rounds of appeals to the Fourth Circuit, before they reached the 
penalty stage for the trial.172  In the case of Joseph Fernandez, the 
former head of CIA operations in Costa Rica, indicted by Independ-
ent Counsel Lawrence Walsh during the Iran-Contra investigation, 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the indictment be-
cause the intelligence agencies were not willing to turn over the clas-
sified information in the form that the trial court determined was 
necessary for a fair trial.173
The intelligence agencies, rather than admit that they do not 
want anyone second-guessing them, or that they are sweeping dirt 
under the carpet, might argue that revealing anything about an ir-
regular rendition will pose an exceptional risk to national security.  If 
challenged, they might stress the importance of “liaison” with other 
intelligence agencies and the need to protect “sources and methods.”  
Behind the scenes, they will push the Attorney General to dismiss a 
criminal prosecution. 
Redress on irregular rendition will be difficult even if the action 
shifts from the criminal arena to the civil arena.  Instead of federal 
prosecutors bringing a criminal case under the torture statute, the 
plaintiffs in a civil case claiming to have been tortured might bring an 
action under the CAT.  These people, however, would be weighed 
down by several burdens.  For instance, foreign officials involved in 
the torture would not likely be subject to American jurisdiction, and 
 170 See Saul M. Pilchen & Benjamin B. Klubes, Using the Classified Information Proce-
dures Act in Criminal Cases: A Primer for Defense Counsel, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 193–
94 (1994). 
 171 Graymail is defined as the “[t]hreat by a defendant in a trial to expose intelli-
gence activities or other classified information if prosecuted.”  NORMAN POLMAR & 
THOMAS B. ALLEN, SPY BOOK—THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ESPIONAGE 274 (2d ed. 2004) 
(1997). 
 172 United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 
931 (2005).  Moussaoui was indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia in 2001.  Id.  
After his case made two trips to the Fourth Circuit, Moussaoui pleaded guilty to all 
the charges against him in 2005.  Neil A. Lewis, Surprise Terror Plea Leaves Unresolved 
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, at 130.  The penalty stage in his case did not begin 
until 2006.  Neil A. Lewis, One Verdict Decided, 9/11 Jury Faces Second, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
5, 2005, at A18. 
 173 United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 164 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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American officials might benefit from substantive and procedural 
protections (e.g. qualified immunity) under the law. 
Although CIPA does not burden civil plaintiffs, they are still no 
match for an executive branch whose goal is to keep them from pry-
ing into secrets.  A civil action related to an irregular rendition might 
fail in the end for lack of justiciability.174  One reason is that the nego-
tiations between intelligence services on an irregular rendition may 
constitute the sort of “political question” which courts tend to avoid 
resolving.175
Moreover, a civil action related to an irregular rendition may be 
dismissed because of the state secrets privilege.176  That privilege can 
prevent plaintiffs from learning more about irregular renditions, the 
sort of “black” operations which courts are loath to disclose.177  In 
general, even if the United States is not a party to the civil suit, the 
executive may assert its evidentiary privilege by intervening in the 
case for that limited purpose.  All the executive needs to do, either as 
a third party that has intervened or as a defendant, is to have the 
head of an executive agency—the Director of Central Intelligence, 
for instance—file something with the court that articulates a danger 
to national security if the case proceeds.178  The court, in response to 
a reasonable assertion of the state secrets privilege, must carve out of 
the case whatever relates to classified information, limiting discovery 
 
 174 See Nejad v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 753, 755 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (citing Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (dismissing action to recover for losses arising out of the 
USS Vincennes’ shooting down of an Iranian airliner)).
 175 Under the political question doctrine, courts will not decide matters “where 
there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coor-
dinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it. . . . ’”  Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) 
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
 176  (1953).  United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 A state secret has been defined 
as “a governmental secret relating to the national defense or the international rela-
tions of the United States.”  228 FED. R. EVID. 509(a)(1) (Proposed draft 1972); see 
also Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 251 
(1972). 
 177 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 1; Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390, 
402 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[T]he court must find that the claim was asserted properly and 
that there is a reasonable danger that disclosure might prejudice the national secu-
rity.”); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“It is self-evident that the 
disclosures sought here pose a ‘reasonable danger’ to the diplomatic and military 
interests of the United States.”).
 178 See, e.g., Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 1 (holding that the Federal Government could 
invoke state secrets privilege to keep Air Force report classified); Halkin, 598 F.2d at 
7 (permitting the government to not disclose whether intelligence information in 
dispute even existed, as the “state secrets privilege is absolute.”). 
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and further inquiry.  If a carving out is not possible, the court must 
close the case down completely.179
The political question doctrine and the state secrets privilege are 
not the only obstacles plaintiffs must surmount because irregular 
rendition, as defined in this Article, has been practiced on non-U.S. 
citizens or “aliens.”  Therefore, to assess the potential for civil suits, 
one should consider what access, if any, aliens have to courts. 
It is possible for aliens to bring lawsuits against United States of-
ficials for treaty violations.180  Under the CAT, however, the United 
States specifically precludes any civil action for acts of torture outside 
its territory.181  Further, the federal torture statute contains an explicit 
preclusion of civil liability.182  Finally, aliens will not fare much better 
in international tribunals.  The United States does not consider itself 
subject to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with 
respect to the CAT,183 and the chances are slim that the United States 
would consent to jurisdiction on a specific case of irregular rendition. 
The equitable doctrine of “unclean hands” may also deprive 
some aliens of access to American courts.184  Lest we forget, the sub-
jects of irregular rendition are said to be terrorists.  One court has al-
ready denied relief to an alien under the CAT because he was found 
to be involved in terrorism.185  Moreover, the Foreign Affairs Reform 
and Restructuring Act of 1998 reiterates the United States policy of 
 179 See Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1364–65 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001). 
 180 See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (specifying that federal courts 
have jurisdiction over civil actions by aliens committed in violation of a treaty or in-
ternational law); John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission of International 
Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 29 (1999) (ex-
plaining that the United States has had the most extensive experience with civil suits 
filed against individuals based on the Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim Protec-
tion Act). 
 181 See United States Convention Against Torture Ratification History, supra note 
71 (noting in Understanding Three that the United States does not view the Conven-
tion as requiring an extra-territorial private right of action for damages). 
 182 18 U.S.C. § 2340B (2000) (“Nothing in this chapter shall . . . be construed as 
creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any 
civil proceeding.”). 
 183 See United States Convention Against Torture Ratification History, supra note 
71 (noting in Reservation Three that the United States does not consider itself 
bound by the Convention's Article 30(1)) 
 184 The unclean hands doctrine is “[t]he principle that a party cannot seek equi-
table relief or assert an equitable defense if that party has violated an equitable prin-
ciple, such as good faith.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 268 (8th ed. 2004).
 185 8 U.S.C.S. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (LexisNexis 2006); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(d)(3) 
(2000); Cheema v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848, 857 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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precluding those aliens who pose a danger to the United States from 
the protections of the CAT.186
Undeterred by such obstacles, an alien who has been subject to 
irregular rendition might still be tempted to file a complaint in fed-
eral court.  Proof that people have acted on this temptation comes 
from two different lawsuits, one filed by Khaled El-Masri, the other by 
Maher Arar.187 At least three causes of action might seem promising 
to such plaintiffs.  First, they might rely on the Alien Tort Statute.188  
Second, they might use the Torture Victim Protection Act.189  Third, 
they might file a Bivens action.190  No matter how they frame their 
complaints, however, their lawsuits are likely to be dismissed. 
 The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) was passed to anchor our new 
nation in the international community.191  This statute gives American 
courts jurisdiction over some violations of the law of nations and 
some treaty obligations.192  The second prong to jurisdiction, namely 
treaty obligations, does not seem as relevant to irregular renditions 
since the United States, as noted, has precluded civil actions that 
stem from violations of the torture statute and from violations of the 
CAT that occur outside the United States.193  Thus, further analysis of 
 186 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-277, at § 2243(c), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–822 (1998). 
 187 Khaled El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D. Va. 2006); Arar v. 
Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 188 See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Arar v. Ashcroft, supra note 108, (alleging that action is 
brought directly under “treaty law”); Complaint at 4, El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 
F.Supp.2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No. 1:05 CV 01417), available at 
http://www.acluva.org/docket/pleadings/elmasri_complaint.pdf (alleging jurisdic-
tion and claim under Alien Tort Statute.  See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350 
(LexisNexis 2006). 
 189 See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Arar v. Ashcroft, supra note 108 (also alleging that ac-
tion is brought “pursuant to the Torture Victim Prevention Act”); see Torture Victim 
Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 190 See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Arar v. Ashcroft, supra note 108 (also alleging that ac-
tion is brought directly under the Fifth Amendment); Complaint at 4, El-Masri v. 
Tenet, supra note 188 (similar Fifth Amendment claim); see Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (holding 
that a violation of constitutional rights can give rise to a damages action against the 
offending federal officials even in the absence of a statute authorizing such relief, 
unless “special factors counseling hesitation” or an explicit congressional declaration 
of another exclusive remedy exists). 
 191 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 722 n.15 (2004).
 192 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or 
a treaty of the United States.”).
 193 The plaintiff could attempt to limit the civil action preclusion under the CAT 
in at least two ways.  First, he could distinguish the preclusion on torture claims from 
decisions related to rendition.  Second, he could argue that the violation of Article 
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irregular rendition focuses mainly on the first prong: violations of the 
law of nations. 
The “law of nations” referred to in the ATS encompasses at least 
a “modest number” of violations that were accepted at common law 
in 1789 as violations of international norms.194  In short, the ATS is set 
within an eighteenth-century paradigm.  According to the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation, Congress created causes of action against pi-
racy, against interfering with ambassadors, and against violating 
norms of “safe conduct.”195  Beyond that, there has been a great de-
bate about whether common law torts have evolved since the ATS was 
adopted.196  In any event, torture may have been included in the 
modest number of violations already accepted at common law or may 
now qualify within the evolved purposes of the ATS. 
The ATS did not receive much attention until 1980, when the 
Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.197  The Filartiga court 
stated that, for purposes of the ATS, the law of nations had evolved 
beyond the common law in 1789.198  Accordingly, the court allowed a 
Paraguayan citizen to sue another Paraguayan citizen in the United 
States for acts of alleged torture that occurred in Paraguay.199  In es-
sence, the United States provided a forum to address atrocities that 
violated jus cogens, even though the United States had no other inter-
est in the case.200  But Filartiga, limited to its facts, did not rule 
whether a similar action could be brought against United States citi-
zens and officials, whether American torturers are the modern 
equivalent of pirates and slave traders. 
Three occurred inside the United States, say, at CIA headquarters for its role in the 
rendition. 
 194 See, e.g., Debra A. Harvey, The Alien Tort Statute: International Human Rights 
Watchdog, or Simply ‘Historical Trivia’?, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 341, 344–45 (1988) 
(“Generally, the courts have defined the Law of Nations as practices which, over a 
long period of time, have evolved into consensual and universal behavioral expecta-
tions among civilized societies.”). 
 195 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. 
 196 See generally Gene Trnavci, The Meaning and Scope of the Law of Nations in the Con-
text of the Alien Tort Claims Act and International Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 193, 
247–50 (2005). 
 197 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 198 Id. at 881. 
 199 Id. at 889. 
 200 Id. at 890 (“[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the 
pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.  
Our holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First 
Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free 
all people from brutal violence.”).
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There may be a difference in the treatment of an official who 
himself tortures versus an official who renders a person to another 
country where he is tortured.  Concerning the latter category of offi-
cials, there may also be a difference in the shock to international 
norms from a deliberate violation of Article Three of the CAT and an 
irregular rendition where torture occurs even though the senders put 
in place careful assurances and substantial post-transfer oversight.  
The knowing violation, in any case, is more egregious than the care-
less one. 
The Supreme Court in 2004 provided more guidance on the 
ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.201  In that case, the Ninth Circuit had 
stated that the ATS “creates a cause of action for an alleged violation 
of the law of nations,”202 ruling that “arbitrary arrest and detention” 
can be characterized as such a violation.203  Although the Supreme 
Court struck down the Ninth Circuit’s broad interpretation of the 
ATS, it recognized “that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant door-
keeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms to-
day.”204  The Supreme Court was cautious.  Absent a clear legislative 
mandate, it recommended against defining new causes of action un-
der an evolving law of nations.205  Since Sosa, the ATS is not as likely 
to apply to arrests and detentions.  The door is not open to such ac-
tions.  Even so, because Sosa is tied to the specific facts of the case, the 
door has not been necessarily shut on all scenarios related to irregu-
lar rendition. 
In 1991 the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) was added 
to the ATS as part of the codification of the CAT into United States 
law.206  The TVPA’s clear purpose is to establish a civil action for 
someone who has been subject to torture.207  Indeed, the Court in 
Sosa spoke of TVPA as a “clear mandate” for making torture action-
able under the law of nations.208  The definitions of torture in the 
TVPA correspond with the definitions in the CAT; if anything, the 
TVPA’s definitions are more specific and illustrative.209  Therefore, a 
 201 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 202 Id. at 699 (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 641 (9th Cir. 
2003)). 
 203 Id. (citing Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 620). 
 204 Id. at 729. 
 205 Id. at 727. 
 206 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 1 (1991). 
 207 See Torture Victim Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350, n. § 2 (LexisNexis 
2005). 
 208 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004). 
 209 Torture Memorandum, supra note 44, at 22–23. 
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suspect who has been rendered inconsistent with the CAT might find 
hope in the TVPA.  While redress is possible through the TVPA, the 
United States is presumed to have sovereign immunity unless a stat-
ute provides an express waiver.210  The TVPA mentions actions under 
the “color of law, of any foreign nation” but does not refer to actions 
under American law or to actions against United States officials.211  
There is scant indication, if any, of a waiver of sovereign immunity. 
Schneider v. Kissinger212 is an important case concerning immunity 
under the TVPA.  In that case, relatives of an assassinated Chilean 
general sued Henry Kissinger, former National Security Adviser and 
former Secretary of State, for his alleged involvement in the assassina-
tion.213  Before dismissing the case as a political question, the court 
noted that “[t]he TVPA imposes civil liability only on an individual 
acting ‘under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any for-
eign nation.’  In carrying out the direct orders of the President of the 
United States, Dr. Kissinger was most assuredly acting pursuant to 
U.S. law.”214  By the Schneider logic, American officials who act under 
orders on irregular renditions seem to be protected from suit under 
the TVPA.  Therefore, unless a plaintiff demonstrates that a United 
States official (for example, an official in the intelligence commu-
nity’s National Clandestine Service) acted outside the scope of his au-
thority and “under the color of foreign law,” it will be difficult for the 
plaintiff to succeed under the TVPA.  That is, simply because an offi-
cial made a mistake in assessing the likelihood of torture in a receiv-
ing country does not necessarily entitle the rendered suspect to dam-
ages.
Finally, a Bivens action is possible when a federal official, operat-
ing under color of law or legal authority, deprives a person of a con-
stitutional right.215  There are some situations where this sort of ac-
tion might apply to irregular rendition.  For instance, a United States 
citizen or a resident alien might be seized on American soil and ren-
dered without any process.  That seizure might be construed as un-
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment or as a violation of due 
process under the Fifth Amendment.216  Or the torture of a citizen or 
 210 See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000). 
 211 Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, n. §2. 
 212 310 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 213 Id. at 253 
 214 Id. at 267 (citation omitted). 
 215 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 409–10 (1971). 
 216 U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V. 
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a resident alien might be construed as cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.217  These scenarios, however, 
are outside the scope of this Article.  Within scope are scenarios in 
which a foreign citizen is snatched from a foreign jurisdiction and 
taken to another foreign jurisdiction.  In such scenarios, foreign citi-
zens are much less likely than American citizens to have due process 
and other constitutional rights.  Even if torture is alleged, at least one 
circuit has stated that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the 
treatment of non-U.S. citizens by officials who are not from the 
United States.218  This statement stands true even where the alleged 
mistreatment (torture of a Guatemalan rebel by Guatemalan forces) 
was at the behest of the CIA.219
III.     ASSURANCES AS REMEDY 
The United States should comply with the rule of law for its own 
sake.  Such compliance is separate from any redress that improperly 
rendered persons may have in American courts.  As far as compliance 
with Article Three of the CAT, assurances from receiving countries 
serve as one of two broad avenues in the direction of legality. 
The United States does not need to be too concerned about ir-
regular renditions to countries such as Switzerland.220  Assurances 
about the proper treatment of rendered suspects are not necessary 
from these countries.  If we asked the Swiss for assurances, for in-
stance, they might lecture us about our abuses at Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo because a request for such assurances would suggest 
that we maintain higher human rights standards than they do.  With 
countries at the other end of the spectrum from Switzerland, no mat-
ter what assurances we receive, no matter what monitoring we believe 
we are putting in place, the United States should remain concerned 
about torture and, hence, reluctant to render.  Returning an Iraqi 
dissident to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, as described in the Iraqi lion’s 
den scenario, is an obvious example.  No combination of assurances 
and monitoring would make that rendition legal.  There would still 
be substantial grounds for believing that the suspect would be tor-
tured upon transfer. 
Even after the extremes are lopped off, many situations are left 
in the middle.  Until a presidential administration adopts a blanket 
 217 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 218 Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 602–03 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom., Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002). 
 219 Id. 
 220 See infra, Part V. 
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policy against all irregular renditions, the situations in the middle 
must be considered.  Accordingly, assurances from the receiving 
countries could play a significant role in determining the legality of 
irregular rendition. 
On several occasions, the Bush Administration has noted that as-
surances affect its decisions on transfers of prisoners.  The United 
States, although careful not to mention any details about CIA activi-
ties, stated in its Second Periodic Report to the Committee Against 
Torture that assurances sometimes play into the balance of whether 
to transfer a person to another government.221  Before that, em-
broiled in the allegations about secret CIA prisons in Europe, Secre-
tary of State Condoleezza Rice stated in 2005 that “[w]here appropri-
ate, the United States seeks assurances that transferred persons will 
not be tortured.”222  Similarly, in 2003, the Department of Defense’s 
General Counsel said that “United States policy is to obtain specific 
assurances from the receiving country that it will not torture the indi-
vidual being transferred to that country.”223
The assurances, of course, must be reliable and must be made in 
good faith to have any value in the calculations under the CAT.224  In 
some cases, as a counter-weight to the possibility of torture in a re-
ceiving country, assurances may tip the balance toward legality.  The 
more reliable the assurances and the more detailed they are, the 
more the balance tips toward legal rendition. 
The President could make a policy decision not to render terror-
ism suspects to questionable countries.  All close calls could be han-
dled by a default decision not to render.  Not rendering on close calls 
could become part of a retrenchment of CIA practices, which may 
have begun with the Detainee Treatment Act that precludes coercive 
interrogations by all United States personnel.225  Precluding some ir-
 221 Second Periodic Report of the United States of America to the Committee 
Against Torture, Annex 1, Part One, Section II, D, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ 
45738.htm#annexes (last visited Oct. 1, 2006). 
 222 Glenn Kessler, Rice Defends Tactics Used Against Suspects, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 
2005, at A01. 
 223 Letter from William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to 
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, June 25, 2003, in 150 CONG. REC. S781-03, S783 (Feb. 10, 
2004).
 224 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 321 (1987) (requiring interna-
tional agreements to be made in good faith, although the importance of this re-
quirement is not necessarily clear). 
 225 Jonathan Weisman, Senators Agree on Detainee Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2005, 
at A1.  (Sen. Lindsey O. Graham said, “McCain’s amendment needs to be part of the 
overall package, because it deals with standardizing interrogation techniques and will 
reestablish moral high ground for the United States.”). 
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regular renditions may indeed be a reasonable policy; but that does 
not seem to be the current policy.  That is not the easy way out from 
the middle. 
A. The Person Behind the Assurance 
The highest assurances come from heads of state in foreign ju-
risdictions about to take control of suspects.  Diplomatic protocol 
would call for the President of the United States to ask for such as-
surances.  President Bush, however, may not be interested in such de-
tails or he may choose not to use political capital in asking for assur-
ances from other leaders.226  Accordingly, assurances from heads of 
state may not always be realistic. 
Even if heads of state are willing to give assurances, regardless of 
who asks for them, such assurances could be less valuable than assur-
ances from lower-level officials.  The head of state, after all, does not 
handle day-to-day details in the prison or detention facility.  In addi-
tion, the security services of the receiving country (that is, the people 
in the room with the rendered suspect) may keep secrets from their 
leader.  In short, gaps may exist between authority and control. 
 The process of asking for and obtaining assurances involves in-
ternational relations between the sending country and the receiving 
country.  Just so, American diplomats might seek assurances from 
their diplomatic counterparts, probably in the receiving country’s 
ministry of foreign affairs.227  The highest assurances, in diplomatic 
rank, would come from the foreign minister.  Further, assurances 
from an ambassador to the United States may have the same (or simi-
lar) value as assurances given by a foreign minister.  The ambassa-
dor’s posting to Washington is often a plum assignment, a step or so 
away from becoming foreign minister.  Most foreign countries also 
have diplomats of an intermediate rank, such as the deputy foreign 
minister, who may provide reliable assurances. 
The diplomatic track, though, has drawbacks.  The United States 
Department of State probably does not hold the terrorism suspects 
who are being considered for irregular rendition; the State Depart-
 226 These are more than theoretical possibilities since the Bush Administration has 
not stated that it has ended the practice of irregular rendition. 
 227 Samuel M. Witten, Deputy Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelli-
gence in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, Written 
Declaration on U.S. Practices on Diplomatic Assurances at 6, Cornejo-Barreto v. 
Seifert, Case No. 01-cv-662-AHS, (C. D. Cal. October 2001), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16513.pdf. (asserting, inter alia, that 
“the Secretary might condition the extradition on the requesting State’s provision of 
assurances related to torture”). 
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ment is not a bureau of prisons.  Control of the suspects lies else-
where—probably with employees and contractors of the Central In-
telligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or the Department of 
Justice.  For this reason, negotiations that the State Department leads 
may not affect actual control of the suspects.  As an alternative, the 
process of obtaining assurances from foreign countries that they will 
not engage in torture should be consolidated with actual control of 
the suspect.  For example, if the CIA is about to transfer a suspect to a 
Bulgarian intelligence service, the negotiation should be between the 
liaison services instead of between diplomats.  The fears of torture, in 
the end, relate less to the conduct of Bulgarian diplomats than to the 
conduct of Bulgarian police and security officers. 
In most parts of the world, diplomats and spymasters usually op-
erate in separate tracks.  But sometimes the lines between diplomacy 
and espionage do blur.228  In general, the diplomats deal in open 
policies while spymasters gather secrets and conduct covert actions.  
Our State Department, unlike the CIA, holds a daily press briefing.229  
Further, intelligence officers, unlike diplomats, are accustomed to 
joint operations and to trading information with officers from other 
intelligence services.  Rendition deals, that is, the trading and trans-
ferring of suspects, can be built on a mutual respect among profes-
sionals. 
The techniques to espionage, what spymasters call “tradecraft,” 
are similar around the world.  Everybody does surveillance.  Every-
body does counter-surveillance.  Everybody tries to gather intelli-
gence from human assets, including officers in opposing services.  
Everybody performs counter-intelligence against penetrations into 
the home service.  Spymasters, the world around, understand each 
other.  So, on irregular renditions of terrorism suspects, the negotia-
tions might be conducted between the intelligence services—the 
handlers of human assets.  This is an example of simple symmetry be-
tween two groups.  If the suspect is in joint control between United 
 228 Diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention may protect them.  See Vi-
enna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 9, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 
U.N.T.S. 241.  If they are revealed as spies, they can be declared persona non grata 
and returned to their home country, but not prosecuted by the country that revealed 
them. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 80 
(1965).
 229 United States Department of State, Daily Press Briefings, available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/ (last visited March 23, 2006) (“The State De-
partment Spokesman, or the alternate, generally briefs the State Department press 
corps on the record, on camera each workday afternoon in the Carl T. Rowan Press 
Briefing Room, room 2209 in the Harry S. Truman building of the U.S. Department 
of State.”). 
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States agencies (say, between the CIA and DOD), and is destined for 
joint control in a foreign jurisdiction (say, between the intelligence 
and law enforcement arms), all parties to the trade should be at the 
table.  Thus, the symmetry becomes more complicated.  No matter 
the level of complexity, if the assurances on irregular renditions are 
to be effective, they should be integrated into relevant chains of 
command in the sending and receiving countries.  Moreover, the CIA 
might gather intelligence through secret means to test the sincerity of 
those foreign officials who give the assurances.  So much is possible. 
B. The Form of the Assurance 
In some foreign jurisdictions, officials may not hesitate to put 
their assurances about the proper treatment of a prisoner in writing.  
The record for their assurances could come under one of many la-
bels: a letter, a demarche, or a memorandum of understanding.  
Whatever the label, both sides to the rendition, the sending and re-
ceiving jurisdictions, would thereby have a copy of the deal.  The writ-
ten record would remind the parties of the solemnity of the under-
standing: entrusting the care of a human being from one jurisdiction 
to another. 
But some foreign jurisdictions may not be willing to put any-
thing in writing.  The reason may be cultural or political.230  Or, offi-
cials may fear leaks from their side.  Or, officials may prefer not to 
have an official record in case a scandal later arises.  In any event, 
when the preferences are against a written record, the assurances 
might come orally in a meeting between an American official and an 
official from the other jurisdiction.  Their “meeting” could be in per-
son, over the telephone, or by e-mail.  The variations are endless. 
Differences in details may or may not affect the value of the as-
surances.  The differences between fountain pens and computers, so 
to speak, may be more style than substance.  Yet, even when assur-
ances from the other jurisdiction are strictly oral, the American offi-
cial will almost surely, after the meeting, make an internal record of 
those assurances within the United States Government.231  The notion 
 230 For example, on March 22, 1999 the Egyptian Minister of the Interior rejected 
a British request for written assurances arguing that they would “constitute an inter-
ference in the scope [of] the Egyptian judicial system and an infringement on Egyp-
tian national sovereignty.” See Statewatch.org, U.K.: Egyptian National ‘Unlawfully De-
tained’ After Intervention of Prime Minister, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/ 
nov/03blair.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2006). 
 231 This assumes the United States officials would not be secretly recording the 
meeting. 
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of a gentleman’s agreement between intelligence services, where 
nothing is ever written down by either side, fits the fantasy of spy nov-
els but not the international practice of espionage.  The spymasters, 
like the diplomats and the lawyers, create piles of paper.  The inter-
nal record on a rendition deal could be filed under many labels: a 
cable, a memorandum for the record, or a letter of understanding. 
Whatever the label for the written record and whether or not the 
writer is an American diplomat, a defense official, or an intelligence 
official, the internal record will probably be distributed among 
United States agencies on a “distribution list” in the government.232  A 
copy of the record will probably go to staffers at the National Security 
Council (“NCS”), including the NSC’s legal adviser.  Rendition, so 
practiced, falls within the NSC’s statutory task of integrating domes-
tic, foreign, and military policies.233  Depending on the NSC’s rela-
tionship with the White House, particularly the relationship between 
the National Security Adviser and the President, a copy of the written 
record may also go to the White House counsel and to the President 
himself.  That said, the White House may prefer not to receive any 
copies.  Along the lines of the Iran-Contra operations, the White 
House may use the NSC as a buffer for legal and political protection 
so policymakers stay untarnished by the rough and tumble of what 
goes on in the field.  Policymakers might be “informed” by word of 
mouth in the corridors of power rather than by paper, thus building 
into the process of irregular rendition some plausible deniability as to 
details.234
Nothing in a statute, case law, or an international convention 
specifically addresses the legality of the range of assurances for an ir-
regular rendition.  Plus, the scholarship, until now, has not reached 
the differences in weight between written assurances and oral assur-
ances.  Assurances under Article Three of the CAT are not controlled 
by incorporation clauses, the parol evidence rule, or other familiar 
concepts of domestic contract law.  Accordingly, assurances on ir-
 232 But it is possible that a United States agency involved in renditions may insist 
on “compartmenting” the information from all other agencies.  In any event, the 
Department of Education probably does not need to be on the distribution. 
 233 The National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. ch. 15 (2000)); 50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6); 50 
U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)-(5). 
 234 It is reported that President Bush instructed the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, George Tenet, not to tell him the locations of secret detainees so that it would 
not affect his interactions with representatives from those countries.  See James Risen 
et al., Harsh C.I.A. Methods Cited in Top Qaeda Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2004, 
at A1 (noting that the CIA searched for remote sites in friendly countries, and was 
allowed to use them without any outside scrutiny). 
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regular renditions fall within a body of law at the fringes of or beyond 
contract law. 
American contract law, while not controlling, provides a frame-
work for analyzing assurances on possible renditions.  The Statute of 
Frauds requires some contracts, such as those which cannot be per-
formed within one year, to be in writing.235  The primary purpose of 
the Statute of Frauds is to prevent fraudulent claims from being en-
forced, but it also has the secondary effect of ensuring that the parties 
enumerate their terms fully and act cautiously in making their 
deals.236  Similar purposes lead toward a preference for written assur-
ances on irregular renditions under Article Three of the CAT.  Some 
detentions may last for more than a year after irregular rendition, 
and officials on the sending and receiving ends of irregular rendition 
should enumerate their terms and act cautiously. 
Contract law is not alone in preferring the written record.  When 
an executive agency conducts covert action, American law requires 
Presidential authorization to be stated in a written “finding.”237  A 
covert action, usually conducted by the CIA, is an activity that is in-
tended to influence political, economic, or military conditions 
abroad while hiding the government’s role.238  The requirement of a 
written finding on covert action is extra evidence of a preference for 
the written over the oral record on intelligence activities.  For irregu-
lar rendition, as a sort of covert action, the assurances should also be 
in writing. 
In American business, it is standard practice in negotiating and 
drafting contracts to include a merger clause.  That clause consoli-
dates all prior understandings, written and oral, into the written con-
tract that the parties are signing.239  A standard merger clause might 
read: “It is expressly agreed by the parties to this contract that the 
contract constitutes the entire and only contract between the parties 
and that any previous agreement . . . is of no effect and shall not be 
considered in the interpretation of the terms of this contract.”240  To 
the extent that lawyers involved in irregular rendition have had 
commercial experience before joining the government—a likely pos-
sibility—their rendition deals may reflect commercial practices.  They 
 235 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110(1)(e) (1981). 
 236 9 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 21:1 (2005). 
 237 50 U.S.C.S. § 413b(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 238 I have assumed that irregular rendition per se does not fit within the definition 
of covert action. 
 239 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210. 
 240 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 4th Forms § 33F:1. 
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may use merger clauses and other provisions that are standard in 
American contracts. 
The commercial analogy may also explain the attitude of Ameri-
can principals to rendition deals.  Some clients in the government 
may react to all the law and legal analysis like clients in the corporate 
world.  Just as principals to commercial deals accuse their lawyers of 
creating far too much paper, intelligence officers on irregular rendi-
tion deals may accuse their government lawyers of making everything 
far too complicated.241
C. Publicizing the Receiving Countries 
Except for isolated comments by a few officials, the Bush Ad-
ministration has not said much about irregular rendition.242  Our gov-
ernment still does not discuss whether specific persons have been 
rendered or whether specific jurisdictions have received renditions 
from the United States.  As a change, the government should reveal 
to the public those countries that are possible recipients of rendered 
suspects.  This would make the government more accountable, while 
not involving the courts through regular rendition or extradition.  To 
relieve some of the public’s legitimate concern about the dirtiness of 
irregular rendition, the government should also reveal those coun-
tries, for foreign policy reasons or for reasons under the CAT, that 
have been ruled out as rendition sites.  This would make the govern-
ment more accountable and would educate the public and American 
allies about an important tactic in American counter-terrorism. 
Government officials, of course, may argue that revelations will 
complicate our foreign relations, breaching promises of secrecy they 
have made to other governments that cooperate with us in counter-
terrorism.  Their arguments would not be completely unreasonable.  
For example, if Jordan has taken renditions from us and if we shine a 
spotlight on them, it is almost certain that Jordan would cease or 
lessen its cooperation because of the potential backlash by anti-
American portions in the Jordanian public.  The stakes on irregular 
rendition are high.  As a State Department official declared about 
transfers from Guantanamo: “Later review in a public forum of the 
 241 See DUANE R. CLARRIDGE, A SPY FOR ALL SEASONS 184 (1997) (“In the last few 
years, the Agency had been infested with lawyers and second-guessed and pilloried in 
hindsight by doughfaces ignorant of what espionage and covert action are all 
about.”). 
 242 While answering questions about the mistaken abduction of El-Masri, Condo-
leezza Rice answered, “when and if mistakes are made, we work very hard and as 
quickly a possible to rectify them.”  Kessler, supra note 106, at A18. 
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Department’s dealings with a particular foreign government regard-
ing transfer matters would seriously undermine our ability to investi-
gate allegations of mistreatment or torture that come to our attention 
and to reach acceptable accommodations with other governments to 
address those important concerns.”243
There is a way, however, to balance our commitments to cooper-
ating governments while generating useful debate on which countries 
should be potential recipients of rendered suspects.  In a welcome 
spurt of modesty, the Bush Administration should open up the de-
bate and recognize that its officials and lawyers do not have all the 
answers.  As with the handling of most legal issues, the administra-
tion’s analysis would benefit from more interaction with scholars and 
the public.  The administration should move from secrecy toward 
transparency. 
If Jordan cooperates with the United States behind the scenes, 
our government could mention Jordan in a list of jurisdictions, some 
of which the administration knows are cooperating, some of which 
are not.  Because Jordan would be mixed into a group of other coun-
tries, it would not have complete anonymity.  Since the United States 
Government would not be acknowledging that Jordan is cooperating 
for sure, the damage to Jordan would not be significantly greater 
than the damage that may have already occurred through leaks and 
rumors.  The process would be controlled.  The improvement in the 
quality of our rendition decisions and in America’s standing in the 
world would more than outweigh the nuisance to Jordan.  The debate 
is something Jordanian officials should realize is in their own interest.  
The value of the debate is something American officials can stress to 
them. 
On a middle road, this Article is part of a process of pressuring 
our government to be more forthcoming about important issues of 
national security.  Since September 11, there has been one occasion 
when lobbying created a better balance between the efficacy of intel-
ligence operations and the public’s right to be informed.  Until the 
9/11 Commission was about to publish its report, the Bush Admini-
stration had neither confirmed nor denied that a few “high-value de-
tainees” were being held in secret locations.  Lobbied by the Commis-
 243 Declaration of Pierre-Richard Prosper at 7, Abdah v. Bush,  
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sion and by the public, the Bush Administration finally relented.244  
The government confirmed the names of ten detainees, including 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (“KSM”), the alleged mastermind of the 
September 11 attacks.245  Since then, no damage to national security 
has occurred from admitting ten names in a footnote to a public 
document.  Indeed, on September 6, 2006, President Bush an-
nounced the transfer of KSM and thirteen other secret detainees to 
Guantanamo.246
Even without pressure, the Bush Administration sometimes 
changes its mind about what must be classified and what can be re-
leased to the public.  Our country has a process for declassifying in-
formation.247  When it suited the Bush Administration, the White 
House sent Secretary of State Colin Powell to the United Nations to 
make the case for war against Iraq.  At the United Nations, Powell 
had been entrusted with intercepts and other sensitive bits of infor-
mation, true or not, declassified days before the presentation to the 
Security Council.248  Since our government does not always clench its 
fists on the secrets, some hope exists for a better balance on irregular 
rendition. 
D. The Specificity of Assurances 
Assurances stretch over a range of specificity.  In a general assur-
ance, the receiving country states that it understands its obligations 
under the CAT and agrees to comply with them.  That assurance 
could be written in one sentence.  In a specific assurance, a list of 
prohibited tactics could be attached.  That assurance might take sev-
eral pages, including attachments.  For example, even if the sending 
and receiving countries cannot agree on whether water-boarding 
constitutes torture under the CAT, the sending country could ask the 
receiving country not to engage in that practice.  All other things be-
ing equal, the more specific the assurances, the more worthwhile they 
are under Article Three of the CAT. 
 244 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 146. 
 245 See id. 
 246 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Threats and Responses: The Overview; President Moves 14 Held 
in Secret to Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at A1.   
 247 The most recent Executive Order on classification procedures, Executive Or-
der No. 13292, directs the declassification of information that is not exempt from 
search and review under sections 105c, 105d, or 701 of the National Security Act of 
1947.  Exec. Order No. 13292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003). 
 248 See Dana Priest, Telling Secrets: Not Just What, But How; Speech Is Revealing on 
Gathering Intelligence, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2003, at A23. 
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E. Repeat Renditions 
Prior renditions are a key factor in assessing additional rendi-
tions to a country.  If the United States concludes that a problem 
country complied with its assurances—not torturing the suspect—it is 
more likely, if nothing else has changed, that the next rendition to 
the country will be legal with assurances.249  On the other hand, if the 
United States has indications that the problem country did not com-
ply with the assurances, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for repeat 
renditions to comply with the law.  The greater the deviation between 
what was called for in the assurances and what occurred in practice, 
the more significant the problem under Article Three of the CAT.  
One credible case of torture, contrary to assurances, might be 
enough to turn gray into black.  Additional renditions, even with 
multiple assurances, might present substantial grounds for believing 
that torture would occur. 
In theory, the taint from prior renditions does not last forever.250  
In practice, the country could take actions to return toward the white.  
Yet, for the near term in which American counter-terrorism policies 
take place, any country painted black should be out of bounds for ir-
regular rendition. 
Another factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis might 
be the experience that countries other than the United States—
perhaps Canada and the United Kingdom—have had with a particu-
lar receiving country on irregular renditions.  The official communi-
cations, whether between diplomats or spymasters, on comparative 
experiences can be kept secret.  Accordingly, Canadian and British 
officials may be more frank with American officials than with Human 
Rights Watch on whether a receiving country has honored its assur-
ances on past renditions.  There are things, good and bad, that the 
public does not always know. 
Up until now, the literature on irregular rendition devotes little 
attention to the situation where the United States reasonably believes 
that the rendition is legal, but, after transfer, reasonably concludes 
that the receiving country has strayed into torture.  To comply with 
treaty obligations in such a situation, the United States must insist 
 249 Indeed, if a country complies with assurances on several cases a point might be 
reached when assurances are no longer necessary. 
 250 Just as immigration law has reclassified countries which require protection un-
der the CAT, it is likely that any classification for irregular rendition may change de-
pending on country conditions.  See Kourteva v. I.N.S., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1130 
(N.D. Cal. 2001) (government shift in Bulgaria from communists to socialist-
democrats prevented CAT from prohibiting transfer of alien). 
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that the torture cease or must do everything possible for the suspect 
to be returned to the United States or to another country where the 
suspect will not be tortured.  Preferably, the suspect will be returned 
to a country like Switzerland.  Such situations are another one of 
those gray areas, which must exist in practice, but are ignored by the 
black and white of many comments on irregular rendition. 
IV.     MONITORING AND OVERSIGHT 
Besides assurances of proper treatment of prisoners by receiving 
countries, other measures help tilt toward legality on close calls of ir-
regular rendition.  One important measure is the willingness of a re-
ceiving country to allow post-transfer monitoring and oversight by 
United States officials or third-parties.251  The relevant standard un-
der the CAT, so often repeated, is whether it is more likely than not 
that a rendered suspect will be tortured in the receiving country.252  
As a part of a rendition deal, the United States could insist that moni-
toring and oversight take place after the transfer.  If the receiving 
country agrees to monitoring and oversight, that lowers the perceived 
odds of torture.253  After transfer of the suspect, the receiving coun-
try’s abiding by the agreement on monitoring and oversight contin-
ues as a back-end factor of legality and loops back as a front-end fac-
tor for additional renditions.  After transfer, the CIA might even use 
secret means to ensure that the receiving country is keeping its end 
of the rendition deal.  The secret means could complement the open 
means of monitoring and oversight. 
Monitoring and oversight could take two basic forms.  First, the 
receiving country might accept visits from human observers.  These 
observers could be American citizens or citizens from other coun-
tries.  Candidates should include the Red Cross and other reputable 
non-governmental organizations.  Second, the receiving country 
might accept technical oversight.  Going beyond the obligations of 
the CAT, this oversight could involve detailed logs, giving the times 
and locations of the interrogations, and could include video and au-
dio recordings of the interrogations themselves. 
 251 Contrary to the Human Rights Watch position on monitoring and assurances, 
see text accompanying notes 145–46 supra, an acquiescence in post-transfer monitor-
ing by a receiving country lends weight to, rather than demonstrates the inadequacy 
of, an assurance. 
 252 See supra. Part II.B 
 253 The monitoring and oversight I have in mind is significant enough to make a 
difference under Article Three of the CAT, but not so extensive that the suspect ef-
fectively remains in American custody and control, subject to constitutional and 
statutory protections that may go beyond Article Three. 
RADSANFINAL.DOC 10/20/2006  2:06:56 PM 
2006] IRREGULAR RENDITION 55 
Like assurances, monitoring and oversight operate on a sliding 
scale.  Monitoring and oversight are not necessary for renditions to 
Switzerland.  At the other end of the scale, monitoring and oversight 
will not legalize renditions of notorious Iraqi defectors to Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq.  In the gray zone, however, monitoring and oversight 
do make a difference.  The closer the call, the more that monitoring 
and oversight become necessary. 
A full analysis of each form of monitoring and oversight provides 
enough content for a separate law review article.  In this respect, the 
analysis is like opening boxes within boxes.  But without opening too 
many boxes, without raising too many questions, I can make some 
general comments.  As to monitoring, the sending country should be 
relatively more assured if the receiving country agrees that a third-
party inspection team may have unfettered and unaccompanied ac-
cess to the suspect held in the receiving country’s facility.  Independ-
ent parties have more value than inspectors who are accompanied at 
all times by the authorities from the receiving country.  In addition, 
the less notice the receiving country requires for the inspection, the 
more the sending country should be reassured.  On the other hand, a 
rule need not be adopted that accompanied access or a long period 
of advanced notice per se makes the assurances and the monitoring 
unacceptable under the CAT.  Again, the analysis is specific to the 
facts on a totality of the circumstances. 
Most would agree that third-party monitoring and oversight 
from organizations such as the Red Cross have more value, in reach-
ing legality, than oversight from United States officials.  Oversight 
from the Red Cross is worth more because its representatives are neu-
tral and because it has no stake in the “intelligence take” from the 
suspect.  To assuage any concerns the Bush Administration has about 
protecting classified information related to renditions, it may insist 
that the Red Cross officials sign confidentiality agreements or obtain 
security clearances, or both.  That would not be unreasonable. 
As to technical oversight, the more intrusive the methods, the 
more value they have in reaching legality.  Videos show more angles 
than still photographs.  Video recordings with sound give a more 
complete record than a sole audio recording.  Five cameras in the in-
terrogation room show more details than one camera. 
But too much faith should not be placed in technology.  Even 
with cameras all over the interrogation booth, the suspect could be 
tortured elsewhere.  In horrible situations, the torturers might in-
struct the suspect outside the booth that if he mentions anything 
about the torture when they are on camera, the treatment off camera 
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will become even worse.  Such threats can also undercut the effec-
tiveness of third-party oversight.  When the suspect is so broken—
when the suspect becomes a slave to his masters—the interrogations 
can be conducted without any signs of torture.254  That is a night-
mare. 
The nightmare is that the rule of law, including assurances and 
monitoring, only goes so far in preventing and ferreting out evil.  
That the rule of law has limits does not mean that practitioners and 
policymakers on irregular rendition have descended into an abyss.  
What it means is that they must continue to struggle, inch by inch, 
measure by measure, to stay out of the underworld.  As much as pos-
sible, professional observers, aided by first-hand observations and by 
technology, must look beyond the obvious for more subtle signs of 
torture.  They must look closer at the receiving country’s specific 
practices. 
V     CATEGORIES OF COUNTRIES 
Irregular renditions can go to many places other than Swiss safe 
havens and Iraqi lion’s dens.  On renditions for intelligence pur-
poses, at least three variables exist.  First, the suspect may be ren-
dered back to his country of origin (defined by citizenship or by resi-
dency).  Or the suspect may be rendered to a third country.  This 
variable is binary.  Second, the receiving country may be a signatory 
of the CAT.  Or the country may not be.  This variable is also binary.  
Third, one’s assessment of the receiving country’s human rights re-
cords may vary.  For the sake of reasonable simplicity, the analysis 
could develop three scenarios within this plane: the receiving country 
could have an excellent record, an in-between record, or a very poor 
record.  This third variable, by definition, has three nodes. 
The product of multiplying the three variables is twelve.  Thus, a 
thorough analysis of irregular rendition might address at least twelve 
patterns.  To illustrate, one pattern involves a rendition to a suspect’s 
country of origin; the country is a member of the CAT; and the coun-
try has an excellent human rights record.  That is the best pattern.  
But rather than cover all patterns, one could delve into country prac-
 
 254 See John T. Parry, What Is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What If We Are?, 64 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 237, 248–49 (2003) (discussing the effect of “escalation” on a victim of 
torture and its ability to shift responsibility for pain endured from the torturer to the 
victim); see also John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should 
Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 743 (2002) (discussing interrogation tech-
niques and whether the use of torture may be, in some cases, more successful than 
traditional means of interrogation). 
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tices.  The third variable, after all, seems most relevant to Article 
Three of the CAT. 
Relying on Amnesty International and on the State Department, 
one can divide the countries into at least three groups concerning 
their treatment of detainees and their reputation for respecting hu-
man rights.255  From top to bottom, three groups emerge.  The hu-
man rights record for the first group is generally good, without any 
reports of torture.  In the words of the State Department, these gov-
ernments “generally respected the human rights of [their] citi-
zens.”256  Irregular renditions to this group should not pose any seri-
ous problems.  Countries in the second group have isolated instances 
of mistreatment and torture, but nothing systematic.  Irregular rendi-
tions to this group, while problematic, are possible with sufficient as-
surances and adequate monitoring and oversight.  Countries in the 
third group have records of abuse, including mysterious disappear-
ances.  Mistreatment and torture are routine, with confessions often 
obtained through beatings.257  Irregular renditions to this group, if 
not impossible under the law, pose the greatest problems for United 
States compliance with the CAT. 
A. Clean Countries 
In the first group, Finland is as close as a country can get to an 
unblemished human rights record.  Finland ratified the CAT on Au-
gust 30, 1989.258  According to our State Department, there are no 
indications of a Finnish official employing torture.259  The prisons in 
Finland are well run and safe for prisoners.260  Finland’s judicial sys-
tem provides prisoners with ample means to present allegations of 
abuse and to obtain redress.261
But no country is perfect.  Amnesty International has criticized 
Finland for not having regulations on the use of force and other re-
straints when deporting foreign nationals.262  Since there have not 
 255 These groupings are illustrative, not comprehensive. 
 256 U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Finland, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41680.htm. 
 257 See U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Prac-
tices—Uzbekistan, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/ 
41717.htm. 
 258 Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66. 
 259 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—Finland, supra note 256. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Amnesty International, Finland Human Rights Report 2005, 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/fin-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
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been any reports of abuse, the lack of regulations is a minor defect in 
Finland’s otherwise outstanding record. 
Switzerland shares Finland’s record for not mistreating prisoners 
and for protecting human rights.263  Switzerland ratified the CAT on 
December 2, 1986.264  Swiss prisons are adequate.  There are some 
reports, however, that the police have used excessive force, especially 
against foreigners.265  Beyond reports of police mistreatment,266 Am-
nesty International is concerned about the Swiss police’s use of taser 
dart-firing stun guns.267  The worst reports from Switzerland concern 
physical attacks against foreign nationals who refuse to leave Switzer-
land to go to their countries of origin.268  Yet, overall, Switzerland is a 
safe place for prisoners.  The odds are slim prisoners will be mis-
treated while in custody there. 
Another country with a good record for treating prisoners is Po-
land.  This is significant because Poland has been mentioned as a 
place where the United States has rendered terrorism suspects.269  Po-
land ratified the CAT on July 26, 1989.270  The Polish authorities gen-
erally respect human rights.271  Because Poland is not as rich as other 
countries in Europe, Polish prisons are poor by international stan-
dards, not matching the prisons of other countries in the first group.  
Although there are concerns about the safety of prisoners from at-
tack, no incidents of torture have been reported.272  Amnesty Interna-
tional does report, however, an excessive use of force that resulted in 
the deaths of three prisoners.273
In sum, these are easy cases.  Unless there are some negative cir-
cumstances connected to a particular rendition, irregular renditions 
may be made to Finland, Switzerland, and Poland in compliance with 
 263 U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Switzerland, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41711.htm. 
 264 Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66. 
 265 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—Switzerland, supra note 263. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Amnesty International, Switzerland Human Rights Report 2005, 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/che-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
 268 Id. 
 269 Craig Whitlock, Investigator Sees Signs of CIA Role in Abductions; Poland and Ro-
mania Queried on Prison Issue, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2005, at A21. 
 270 Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66. 
 271 U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Poland, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41701.htm. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Amnesty International, Poland Human Rights Report 2005, 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/2eu-index-eng and http://web.amnesty.org/ 
report2005/pol-summary-eng (last visited Aug. 24, 2006). 
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the CAT.  Neither assurances nor post-transfer monitoring is neces-
sary to reach a conclusion that the terrorism suspect will not be tor-
tured. 
B. Repeat Offenders 
So many countries are in the third group—at the bottom—that 
this Article can limit itself to those countries mentioned as United 
States allies on counter-terrorism.  Uzbekistan, for one, has an atro-
cious human rights record.274  Terrorism suspects, often held for long 
sentences after unfair trials, suffer worse than common criminals in 
Uzbekistan.275  Torture is common in the form of beatings, suffoca-
tion, electric shock, rape, and other sexual abuses.276  Information ob-
tained through torture in pretrial facilities is often used against de-
fendants at trial.277  Death sentences are common, as are secret 
executions.278  The United Nations reports that torture is systematic 
in Uzbekistan.279 Official Uzbek investigations into allegations of tor-
ture are neither prompt nor impartial.280
Despite its poor human rights report, Uzbekistan has shown 
signs of improvement.  Torture is not suspected in any prison deaths, 
although negligence by prison officials continues to result in 
deaths.281  To ameliorate Uzbekistan’s reputation, the Uzbek Cabinet 
of Ministers has taken steps to implement the CAT.282  All in all, Uz-
bekistan’s human rights record is black with some patches of white. 
Egypt also has a poor human rights record.  Even though the 
Egyptian Constitution prohibits inflicting “physical or moral harm” 
upon detainees, the use of torture and abuse by security services is 
common.283  When Egypt ratified the CAT, it did so with a reservation 
to Article Twenty, preventing outside observers from investigating al-
 
 274 Peter Finn, Kyrgyzstan Signals Uzbek Extraditions, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at 
A26. 
 275 Amnesty International, Uzbekistan Human Rights Report 2005, 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/uzb-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
 276 U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Uzbekistan, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41717.htm. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Amnesty International Report, Uzbekistan Human Rights Report 2005, supra 
note 275. 
 279 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—Uzbekistan, supra note 276. 
 280 Amnesty International Report, Uzbekistan Human Rights Report 2005, supra 
note 275. 
 281 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—Uzbekistan, supra note 276. 
 282 Id. 
 283 U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Egypt, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41720.htm. 
RADSANFINAL.DOC 10/20/2006  2:06:56 PM 
60 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1 
 
legations of torture there.284  But the United Nations Committee 
Against Torture has still found a systematic pattern of abuse in 
Egypt.285  Torture and mistreatment are often used to extract infor-
mation during interrogations.286  Prisoners are detained incommuni-
cado for long periods and the authorities do not keep the reports 
that the CAT requires.287  The methods of abuse include: “blindfold-
ing victims; suspending victims from a ceiling or doorframe with feet 
just touching the floor; beating victims with fists, whips, metal rods, or 
other objects; using electrical shocks; and dousing victims with cold 
water.”288  Prisoners, whether men, women, or children, are threat-
ened with and subjected to sexual assault, and the threats include the 
possibility that family members will be raped.289
While Egypt has made many arrests connected to terrorism, the 
government has not provided a realistic number of how many people 
are actually held.290  The official number is 800, but Amnesty Interna-
tional puts the number far closer to 3000, many of whom have been 
tortured.291  Terrorism suspects are tried in military courts where they 
are denied fair trials.292  While there are indications of several deaths 
from torture in Egypt, very few of the perpetrators have been brought 
to justice, in part, because of insufficient investigations into the inci-
dents.293
Prisoners who have been returned to Egypt from other countries 
suffer the risk of mistreatment and torture.294  For example, since 
Yemen returned fifteen Egyptian nationals to Egypt, nothing is 
known about their locations and their fates.295  They have disap-
 284 Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66. 
 285 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—Egypt, supra note 283. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. 
 290 Amnesty International, Egypt Human Rights Report 2005, 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/egy-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. 
 295 See Id. (noting that “[i]n February, the Yemeni authorities handed over 15 
Egyptian nationals including Dr. Sayyid ‘Abd al-Aziz Imam al-Sharif, Muhammed’ 
Abd al-Aziz al-Gamal and Uthman al-Samman. The last two had been sentenced to 
death in absentia in 1999 and 1994 respectively.  The fate and whereabouts of those 
returned were not known to AI or, reportedly, to their families and friends.”); see also 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/yem-summary-eng. 
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peared from public view into darkness.  Based on its human rights re-
cord, Egypt’s reputation is black. 
Syria, although a signatory to the CAT,296 joins Egypt near the 
bottom of the list for the treatment of prisoners.  As a leading state 
sponsor of terrorism, Syria contravenes many United States policies 
in the Middle East.297  Nonetheless, in the global struggle against the 
al-Qaeda brand of terrorism, Syria has been identified as the recipi-
ent of at least one terrorism suspect from United States control: 
Maher Arar, taken from the immigration context.  The Syrian Ambas-
sador to the United States, Imad Moustapha, has acknowledged that 
the United States transferred Arar to Syrian custody.298  Denying that 
Arar was mistreated there, the Syrian Ambassador says Arar was re-
leased because the Syrians could not link him to any acts of terror-
ism.299
Arar may not be the only case of irregular rendition from 
American to Syrian control.  Reports indicate that forces from the 
United States arrested and interrogated a terrorism suspect in Mo-
rocco and then secretly transferred him to Syria where he is being 
held in a tiny underground cell.300
Syria’s human rights record is marred by arbitrary arrests, by un-
fair trials, and by torture which has resulted in at least nine deaths.301  
Even though the Syrian Constitution prohibits any physical or mental 
torture, our State Department reveals credible evidence of frequent 
torture in Syria.302  The methods of abusing prisoners include: “fin-
gers crushed; receiving beatings to their face and legs; having cold 
water thrown on them; being forced to stand for long periods of time 
during the night; hearing loud screams and beatings of other detain-
ees; being stripped naked in front of others; and being prevented 
 296 Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66. 
 297 See Douglas Jehl, The Mideast Turmoil: Diplomacy; U.S. Avoids Criticism of Raid; 
Urges Israel to Use Caution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2003, at A1 (“. . . the United States has 
long called Syria [] a state sponsor of terrorism.”); Christopher Marquis, Syria Said to 
Send Arms Again to Lebanon Guerillas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at A6 (noting that 
Washington lists Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism). 
 298 CBS News, 60 Minutes II, His Year In Hell, July 15, 2005, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/07/11/60II/main708164.shtml. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Amnesty International, Syria Human Rights Report 2005, 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/syr-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
This allegedly occurred to Syrian-born German national Muhammad Haydar Zam-
mar.  Id. 
 301 U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Syria, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41732.htm. 
 302 Id. 
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from praying and growing a beard.”303  Other methods include: “ad-
ministering electrical shocks; pulling out fingernails; forcing objects 
into the rectum; beating, sometimes while the victim was suspended 
from the ceiling; hyperextending the spine; bending the detainees 
into the frame of a wheel and whipping exposed body parts; and us-
ing a backward-bending chair to asphyxiate the victim or fracture the 
victim’s spine.”304  Even children are not spared.  Reports indicate 
that four school children were beaten with electric cables, had their 
heads banged together, and were ordered to strip on the threat of 
further beating.305  Such methods are used to extract information and 
confessions, and Syrian officials up to the level of brigadier general 
have applied them.306  In general, Syria’s human rights record is 
black. 
In sum, even without any negative circumstances connected to a 
particular rendition, irregular renditions to Uzbekistan, Egypt, and 
Syria generally pose problems of compliance with the CAT.  The 
problems there are so severe that they may not be resolved through 
assurances, post-transfer monitoring, or a combination of the two.  
The records for these countries are dark enough that disbelief cannot 
be suspended.  For the time being, these countries should be re-
moved from the list as recipients of irregular renditions from the 
United States and other countries.  As a final verdict on specific cases, 
unless the United States demonstrates some special factors in its fa-
vor, such as extensive assurances and extensive monitoring, the ren-
ditions of Abu Omar and Mamdouh Habib to Egypt and of Maher 
Arar to Syria may not have strictly complied with Article Three of the 
CAT.  In hindsight, that much seems clear. 
C. Gray Areas 
Assurances and monitoring are most relevant on renditions to 
the second group.  Bulgaria is one country in the middle.  Bulgaria is 
a signatory to the CAT.307  Some prisoners have reportedly been mis-
treated in Bulgaria, and some of the mistreatment by law enforce-
ment officials may have crossed into torture.308  The police have 
 303 Id. 
 304 Id. 
 305 Amnesty International, Syria Human Rights Report 2005, 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/syr-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
 306 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—Syria, supra note 301. 
 307 Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66. 
 308 Amnesty International Report, Syria Human Rights Report 2005, supra note 
305. 
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beaten criminal suspects during initial interrogations.309  Two specific 
incidents have been reported.  Police officers released dogs on Roma 
Assen Zarev in an attempt to learn the whereabouts of some other 
men, and threatened to shoot him.310  In another interrogation, po-
lice beat Boris Daskalov on the soles of his feet with rubber trun-
cheons, having stuffed a cloth in his mouth to silence him.311  Daska-
lov, it is reported, was handcuffed on his arms and legs and 
suspended between two chairs with a wooden stick between his arms 
and his knees.312  The United Nations Committee Against Torture is 
concerned about such cases of prisoner mistreatment, particularly 
the case of Zarev, which may have reached the threshold of torture.313  
The Zarev and Daskalov incidents, while deplorable, do not suggest 
that such treatment is routine or would be the likely fate of someone 
rendered to Bulgaria.  Based on its human rights record, Bulgaria’s 
reputation is neither white nor black. 
Problems similar to those in Bulgaria exist in Romania, another 
country mentioned as a possible site for secret CIA interrogations.314  
Romania ratified the CAT on December 18, 1990.315  There are sev-
eral reports of Romanian law enforcement officials mistreating pris-
oners with some cases crossing into torture.316  The Romanian prisons 
in which the mistreatment has occurred have been described as “in-
human and degrading.”317  As in Poland, such degrading conditions 
are probably a result of Romania’s limited budget rather than a de-
liberate effort to degrade prisoners.  Inappropriate means of re-
straints, notably chains and shackles, are a common problem in Ro-
mania.318  Several female prisoners allege that law enforcement 
officials raped them while they were in custody.319  Another problem 
in Romania is widespread corruption, which affects the judiciary and 
undermines the media and other organizations.320  Even so, torture is 
 309 U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Bulgaria, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41674.htm. 
 310 Amnesty International, Bulgaria Human Rights Report 2005, 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/bgr-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
 311 Id. 
 312 Amnesty International, Bulgaria Human Rights Report 2005, supra note 310. 
 313 Id. 
 314 Whitlock, supra note 269. 
 315 Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66. 
 316 Amnesty International, Romania Human Rights Report 2005, 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/rom-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
 317 Id. 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. 
 320 Id. 
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not routine or prevalent.  On balance, Romania’s human rights re-
cord is also gray. 
Jordan approaches the bottom of the second category, and a 
reasonable argument can be made for putting Jordan in the third 
group.  Although Jordan has ratified the CAT,321 the human rights 
violations in Jordan seem worse than in Bulgaria and Romania.  Sig-
nificant to the policy debate, Jordan has been mentioned as a recipi-
ent of rendered suspects from the United States and as a behind-the-
scenes ally of the United States in counter-terrorism.322
There are substantial allegations of abuse and torture during de-
tention and interrogation in Jordan.  Verification of these allegations, 
however, has been difficult because prisoners are not provided timely 
access to counsel.323  Common methods of interrogation in Jordan 
are “beating, sleep deprivation, extended solitary confinement, and 
physical suspension.”324  Many detainees who have allegedly been mis-
treated and tortured were arrested for terrorism; one suspected ter-
rorist allegedly died in custody from abuse by prison staff.325  Worse, 
Amnesty International questions the impartiality of official investiga-
tions into these allegations.326  Moreover, terrorism suspects may not 
receive due process when they appear before the State Security 
Court, a panel of military judges that handles terrorism cases.327  As a 
result of such factors, Jordan’s human rights record is a dark shade of 
gray. 
 321 Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66. 
 322 See John Crewdsen, Suspected CIA Tactics Spread Outrage in EU; Human-Rights 
Concerns Arise over ‘Rendition’ of Terrorist Suspects, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 2006, at C4. (“Pub-
lished estimates attributed to unnamed sources put the total number of renditions 
since Sept. 11 at 100 and 120, with some suspects known to have been deposited in 
Syria, Jordan, and Mexico.”); Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons; 
Debate Is Growing Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up after 
9/11,  WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1 (“These prisoners, some of whom were origi-
nally taken to black sites, are delivered to intelligence services in Egypt, Jordan, Mo-
rocco, Afghanistan and other countries, a process sometimes known as ‘rendition.’”); 
Ken Silverstein, Jordan Has Complex Bond with the U.S. Close Up, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 
12, 2005, at A3 (“Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate, or GID, has surpassed 
Israel’s Mossad as America’s most effective allied counter-terrorism agency in the 
Middle East.”). 
 323 U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Jordan, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41724.htm. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Amnesty International, Jordan Human Rights Report 2005, 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/jor-summary-eng. (last visited Aug. 24, 2006). 
 326 Id. 
 327 Id. 
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In sum, even without any negative circumstances connected to a 
particular rendition, irregular renditions to Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Jordan pose general problems of compliance with the CAT.  Of the 
three, Jordan has the worst record.  In specific cases, these problems 
may be resolved through assurances, post-transfer monitoring, or a 
combination of the two.  These are difficult cases.  These are cases 
where assurances and monitoring can make a difference. 
VI.     CONCLUSION 
Irregular renditions, contrary to the opinions of the City Bar, 
Human Rights Watch, and others, are possible under American law.  
Assurances and monitoring and oversight, if genuine, can make a dif-
ference in decreasing the perceived likelihood that a suspect will be 
tortured after he is transferred from United States control. 
Law and policy do not always coincide.  Something can be legal, 
even if it is bad policy.  Our executive branch, of course, could at-
tempt to be pure by not taking any chances with irregular rendition.  
As a matter of policy, the executive branch might render people 
through irregular means only to the cleanest of countries.  But such a 
policy still requires a standard.  Even the criminal law standard, proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, is not 100% certainty of guilt.  Be that as 
it may, the United States might render people only when convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the rendered person will neither be 
tortured nor treated by cruel, inhuman, or degrading tactics.  Such a 
policy might make sense for the domestic consensus behind counter-
terrorism and for convincing the rest of the world to support the 
United States.  Such a policy helps retake some sort of high ground.  
But such a policy, as this Article has demonstrated, takes the United 
States beyond its legal obligations under the CAT. 
Even a blanket policy against rendition blurs into gray.  If offi-
cials have doubts about a receiving country and if there is no better 
country to take the suspect, the result will be more people detained 
in the United States and more people granted political asylum in the 
United States.  No matter which direction is chosen, there are costs to 
a quest for purity; and inertia has its own costs.  The experience in 
American prisons and in other American detention facilities around 
the world has shown that our prisoners are not perfectly safe from 
mistreatment.328  We are not the cleanest of the clean.  Whether the 
 328 See Josh White, Abu Ghraib Dog Tactics Came from Guantanamo, WASH. POST, July 
27, 2005, at A14; Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, Inquiry Finds Abuses at Guantanamo Bay, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2005, at 35; Eric Schmitt, Abuses at Prison Tied to Officers in Intelli-
gence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, at A1. 
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United States renders suspects or keeps them itself, the potential for 
abuse always exists.  That is the harsh reality to holding people 
against their will. 
Stepping into the gray, I have shown some ways in which irregu-
lar rendition can comply with American law for policymakers who 
dare to consider irregular rendition as a tactic in counter-terrorism 
and for an executive branch which does not veer toward the sancti-
monious.  My thesis has not been winks and nods for people who 
want to take the gloves off.  Instead, my thesis reflects the importance 
of abiding by the rule of law while engaged in secret practices.  Out 
in the open, a more regular process for irregular rendition is possi-
ble. 
A more regular form of irregular rendition, to be sure, is not the 
same as regular rendition or extradition.  But a more open process is 
far better for a democracy than a program of irregular rendition that 
operates completely in the shadows.  Irregular rendition is taken into 
lighter shades of gray when the United States obtains reasonable as-
surances from the receiving country and carries out reasonable moni-
toring and oversight after transfer.  That is a sensible direction. 
Once the political posturing on irregular rendition has stopped, 
the legal analysis is not especially difficult.  As with many other topics, 
it involves the interpretation of conventions, statutes, and cases.  It 
involves the reasonable application of facts to standards.  The most 
difficult task is to preserve American democracy as we fight barbarism 
around the globe.  That is a task for everyone, and part of a regular 
process that should never be extinguished. 
 
